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The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of
Linking International Trade and Intellectual Property
Rachel Brewster*

Abstract
The World Trade OrganiZation's Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement is controversial, requiring WTO members to establish a host of domestic
institutionsto support intellectualproperty rghts, including substantive laws creating rghts and
a host of enforcementprocedures. Trade scholars and development advocatesfrequenty criticize
the agreementas economically harmful to developing countries. This Article does not argue that
the TRIPS Agreement is beneficialfor developing states, but highlights how the agreement has
produced some surprising benefits over the last decade and a half First, the TRIPS
Agreements requirement that developing states make the domestic enforcement of intellectual
property rules available is weak. The TRIPS Agreement relies on the existence of domestic
remedies to enforce intellectualproperty rules. This reliance is unwarranted,however, because
states are explicitly exempted from any obligation to allocate significant resources (i.e. police or
prosecutors) to enforce these laws. Nor are courts orjudicial authorities required to order the
remedies that the TRIPS Agreement gives them the authority to provide. The result is that
states can set their effective level of intellectualpropertyenforcement at a level well below that of
developed states with similar laws and enforcement institutions. Second, this article highlights
the beneficial effects that trade retaliation in intellectual property can have for developing
countries. The possibility of retaliatingby suspending the TRIPS Agreement's obligationsgives
developing states much greaterleverage to enforce other trade obligations againstdeveloped states.

*

Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks are due to Daniel Abebe, Bill Alford, Gabby
Blum, Anu Bradford, Glenn Cohen, Ros Dixon, Tom Ginsburg, Jack Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson,
Gerry Neuman, Ben Roin, Paul Stephan, Matthew Stephenson, Jed Shugerman, Jeannie Suk, Joel
Trachtman, Mark Wu and all the participants of the University of Chicago Law School's
International and Comparative Law Workshop for conversations about this topic and comments
on the paper. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I worked for the United
States Trade Representative's Office (USTR) during the time the United States-Subsides on Upland
Cotton case was proceeding through WTO dispute settlement. The views in this paper are my own
and do not represent the views of the USTR or its staff.

1

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Table of Contents
2
....................
...........
I. Introduction.................
II. The TRIPS Agreement.........................................
8
A. The Negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.......................... 8
B. TRIPS as Global Intellectual Property Policy
...
.........................
14
III. Enforcing the TRIPS Agreement: Domestic Law Requirements..............17
A. The Requirements of the TRIPS Agreement
................
..... 19
1. Differences in enforcing a non-discrimination rule and a minimum
standard rule
....................................................
19
2. The requirements in the TRIPS text..........................21
B. International Review of TRIPS Enforcement Obligations ......
..... 26
C. Private Enforcement Through Civil Remedies ....................
32
D. Conclusions on the Domestic Enforcement of TRIPS........
......... 34
IV. TRIPS as Retaliation
..................................
...... 35
A. Collective Sanctioning Regime
..........................
..... 36
B. The Use of Intellectual Property in Sanctions
..........
........... 40
1. Credible sanctions
.......................................
41
2. More effective sanctions
.......................
........... 43
C. Intellectual Property Retaliation as "Piracy" ............
.......... 46
1. Targeting Intellectual Property Rights-holders..........
.................... 46
2. Piracy as Theft...............
....................
..... 48
D. Political Economy Issue: Linking TRIPS and Agriculture
............ 49
V. Conclusion...............
.................................
52

I. INTRODUCTION
The Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement is
controversial. Negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round that created the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the TRIPS Agreement created a minimum
standards regime in intellectual property for all member states of the WTO. This
was a major change to the international trade system. Intellectual property rights
went from being almost entirely outside of the jurisdiction of trade institutions
to having the status of a core obligation of the global trading system. Some
commentators view this as a positive development, extending protections for
intellectual property goods, which are increasingly becoming a significant
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portion of international trade in foreign markets.' The dominant narrative,
however, is that the TRIPS Agreement is detrimental, imposing a level of
intellectual property protection that is too high for much of the developing
world.2 Strict intellectual property enforcement places many goods, most
importantly life saving medicines, further out of the reach of developing states.
Some commentators further argue that the process of adopting the TRIPS
Agreement was itself flawed-an act of economic coercion whereby the key
states in the developed world effectively left the developing world with no
choice but to accept it.3
Yet the link between trade and intellectual property has developed in
surprising ways. The expansion of intellectual property protections through the
WTO was intended to assure rights-holders with greater security, but the effects
of tying intellectual property to market access have proven less straightforward
than intellectual property holders had hoped. The TRIPS Agreement has actually
provided developing countries with some benefits that few anticipated. Two
aspects of the TRIPS Agreement have been critical in this regard. To start, the
1

See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS
Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 Intl Lawyer 345, 346 (1995) (describing TRIPS as providing
intangible goods, in which developed countries have a comparative advantage, with the necessary
property rights to preserve trade between nations); Jacques J. Gorlin, The Business Community and
the Uruguay Round, in Charles E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield, eds, Intellectual Propery Rzghts and
Capital Formation in the Next Decade 170, 171-72 (Univ Press of Am 1988) (claiming that foreign
reproductions "seriously distort international trade, destroy markets, and cause extensive losses to
industry worldwide"). See also Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,Developing Countries, and the
Doha "Solution", 3 Chi J Intl L 47, 65-68 (2002) (arguing that TRIPS provides greater incentives
for the development of drugs to treat the diseases that plague developing nations).

2

See Jos6 E. Alvarez and Jagdish Bhagwati, Aftenvord: The Question of Linkage, 96 Am J Intl L 126,
127 (2002) (stating that the TRIPS Agreement "facilitates, even enforces with the aid of trade
sanctions, what is in the main a payment by the poor countries (which consume intellectual
property) to the rich countries (which produce it)"); Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007
Mich St L Rev 143, 167-69 (2007) (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement was the result of uneven
bargaining power and results in the perpetuation of wealth disparities); Jerome H. Reichman and
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, HarmoniZation Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafing a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 Duke L J 85, 94-98 (noting that TRIPS, in practice, puts a heavy
burden on developing countries attempting to compete in knowledge goods); Peter K. Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind L J 827, 871 (2007) (arguing that TRIPS requires "poor
countries to develop a rich-country intellectual property system").

3

See Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globaktation of Intellectual Property Rights 172-73
(Cambridge 2003) (concluding that views of international agreements as mutually advantageous
are insufficient to explain TRIPS, which was negotiated "in a broader context of economic
coercion and asymmetrical power"). See also Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, Distributive
Politics and InternationalInstitutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 Case W Res J Intl L 21, 48-49 (2004)
(arguing that TRIPS has perverse distributive effects that were achieved through economic
coercion); Donald P. Harris, CanyingA GoodJoke Too Far TRIPS and Treaties ofAdhesion, 27 U Pa J
Intl Econ L 681, 736-38 (2006) (describing TRIPS as containing "grossly unjust terms" achieved
through economic coercion).
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TRIPS Agreement is difficult to enforce against developing states. It allows
developing states to act strategically, modulating their enforcement of intellectual
property rights to achieve a level of domestic protection that is closer to their
preferred level. In addition, the linkage between intellectual property and trade
provides developing countries with a credible threat in WTO dispute settlement
that they previously lacked: the threat to suspend intellectual property
protections in their national markets. This threat allows developing countries to
address trade violations by developed states in the areas most salient to
developing states-namely agriculture issues. Together, these elements have
reversed the fortunes of some rights-holders in developed states-they have
made themselves the hostages for their government's continued compliance
with international trade rules but have failed to achieve security for their rights in
the global marketplace.
On balance, the TRIPS Agreement may nonetheless be detrimental to
developing states. These countries, fearing the reaction of developed state
governments, might refrain from taking full advantage of the flexibilities that
TRIPS offers. Even with the robust use of these flexibilities, developing states
may find that the TRIPS Agreement imposes constraints on their abilities to
produce or import pharmaceuticals or other critical goods. Nonetheless, the
TRIPS Agreement is not as constraining as intellectual property rights-holders in
developed states intended it to be. Over the last decade and a half, the
agreement has developed-imposed constraints on developing states, as
expected-but also producing some surprising benefits.
More broadly, this Article examines the complex relationship between
domestic politics and international law as well as the unexpected consequences
of institutional design. The TRIPS Agreement engages domestic policies in a
manner that is unusual for international agreements. Most international
agreements establish substantive outcomes that the state must meet but do not
engage the issue of how the state will meet those obligations. The TRIPS
Agreement turns this standard international law practice on its head, demanding
that states alter their governmental structure by adopting specific domestic
institutions but not requiring states to meet specific enforcement outcomes, such as
a set of targets for intellectual property enforcement. Negotiators from
developed governments chose this approach as a means of changing the legal
culture in developing countries. By demanding the creation of domestic
institutions, these negotiators expected that a respect for intellectual property
rights would become embedded in the domestic political culture of developing
countries: intellectual property rights would be created and enforced as a part
and parcel of domestic law rather than international pressure. Yet this strategy
did not fully anticipate how exported institutions would be received in different
political systems. As this Article discusses, developing states have different
policy preferences that influence the functioning of their domestic institutions.

4
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While police and prosecutors in developed states may make intellectual property
rights enforcement a priority, there are few reasons to expect this to be true in
developing states. Similarly, judges in developing states may have little interest
in imposing strong remedies (criminally or civilly) for intellectual property
infringement, even if they possess the authority to do so.
In addition, developments in international law can have unexpected effects
on domestic politics. By incorporating intellectual property rights into the World
Trade Organization system, developed states were pressing their advantage. To
extract concessions on intellectual property rights from developing states, the
US and the European Communities withdrew from the earlier global trade
agreement-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).
Developing states had to sign onto the TRIPS Agreement to maintain their
previous level of market access to these developed states. Yet the linkage has
turned out to be helpful for developing states by providing them with leverage
that they previously lacked. By embedding intellectual property rights in a multiissue regime, developing states can make the enforcement of intellectual
property rights contingent on developed states compliance' with other trade
issues. Intellectual property rights-holders have found themselves drawn into
domestic political battles in which they formerly had no direct interest.
This Article proceeds in four sections. Section II reviews the negotiation
and adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, including its substantive requirements.
This Section discusses how rights-holders in the US, the European
Communities, and Japan sought to move intellectual property issues into trade
negotiations. Global trade negotiations offered rights-holders an opportunity to
raise the minimum level of intellectual property protection and to extend these
protections to a wide geographic area. This Section also reviews some common
popular and scholarly criticisms of the Agreement, most importantly that the
TRIPS Agreement effectively is a wealth transfer from poorer countries to richer
countries.
The third Section turns to the issue of enforcement of intellectual property
rights under the TRIPS Agreement. The model for trade liberalization has
traditionally been one of preventing discrimination based on national origin.
States are not required to adopt trade regulations, but any state's decision to
regulate must be made on a non-discriminatory basis (that is, all WTO members
must receive the same treatment and, once past the border, imported goods
must receive national treatment).' For rights-holders, such a non-discriminatory

4

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") (1994) Arts 1 (most favored nation
obligation), 3 (national treatment obligation). For a discussion of how these two principles work
together to create a non-discrimination regime, see John H. Jackson, The World Trading System,
157-70, 213-245 (Michigan 2d ed 1999); Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation
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model was unacceptable for intellectual property negotiations. Where trade
partners provided only low levels of intellectual property rights, the guarantee of
non-discriminatory enforcement of those rights was cold comfort. The resulting
negotiations developed along a different model, establishing a floor for
intellectual property rights in each member state. Rights-holders envisioned that
domestic authorities-police, prosecutors, and judges-would monitor and
enforce intellectual property rules. If domestic authorities failed to enforce these
rights effectively, then the WTO dispute resolution system would demand that
the government adopt effective measures.
As Section III discusses, this vision of enforcement has not materialized.
While the TRIPS Agreement requires states to adopt specific intellectual
property laws, the agreement fails to establish a baseline for judging a state's
enforcement efforts. Rather, the TRIPS Agreement demands the creation of
elaborate domestic legal institutions-such as criminal law penalties and
administrative remedies-but does not require that governments actually
dedicate any resources to supporting these institutions. In fact, the TRIPS
Agreement goes even further, explicitly relieving states of any obligation to
allocate government resources to the enforcement of intellectual property law.
Essentially, the TRIPS Agreement relies on the existence of formal sanctions
and not the efforts of governments to enforce domestic laws. This reliance
makes little sense. A system of public enforcement requires government
resources to detect and prosecute violations and to use legal sanctions to punish
them. It is the combination of these two elements that establishes the
government's level of enforcement. This system allows developing states to vary
the effective level of property rights in their own domestic markets. So long as
the government adopts the correct institutions, it can have lower effective levels
of intellectual property protection than developed states with the same laws and
enforcement institutions without breaching WTO law.
This picture is complicated by the TRIPS Agreement's requirement that
each state establish a system of civil remedies for intellectual property violations.
The civil system might, in practice, be far more important than the
administrative or criminal system if foreign rights-holders are willing to bear the
costs of detecting and prosecuting intellectual property infringements. Yet this
system also has limitations. Depending on the costs of intellectual property
reproduction (for example, pharmaceuticals versus DVDs), private actors may
find that the benefits of shutting down a single producer to be more costeffective (high reproduction costs) or less cost-effective (low reproduction
costs). Even if the rights-holder decided to bring a civil claim, the domestic
of InternaionalTrade 28-30 (Routledge 3d ed 2005); Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Pog of
the World Trade Organiaion,308-74 (Cambridge 2005).

6

Vol. 12 No. 1

The SurprisingBenefits

B

ewter

court system has significant discretion in providing a remedy. The TRIPS
Agreement requires the government provide judges the authority to issue
injunctions and order compensatory damages in civil actions. However, the state
is under no obligation to ensure that its judges actually use such authority.
Domestic judges can refuse to order these remedies (in any one case or in all
cases), and yet the state would remain in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
Section IV explores the role of the TRIPS Agreement in the international
enforcement of trade rules. This Section argues that intellectual property
retaliation is far more advantageous to developing states, compared to retaliation
in goods, when targeting developed states. This is true both in terms of the
economic effects on the developing state and the political effects of the sanction
on the developed state.
Developing states have long maintained that the WTO dispute settlement
system is still power-based. Although legal decisions at the WTO are made based
on the merits of each case, the remedy is still highly contingent on the state's
market power. The WTO system allows states to retaliate with trade sanctions if
the respondent state does not cease its violation. Small and developing states are
often unable to threaten credibly to impose significant economic harm on their
developed trading partners. As a result, a developing state may be able to win the
legal case at the WTO and yet be unable to enforce the judgment. The TRIPS
Agreement is a leveler in this regard. Developing states can permit domestic
industries to reproduce protected intellectual property from the respondent state
up to the value of the WTO-authorized retaliation.
As trade scholars have discussed, intellectual property retaliation has
several attractive characteristics for developing states. First, it improves net
welfare for the developing state-it does not require that the state bear an
economic loss to sanction the violating state, as do most suspensions of trade in
goods or services. Second, the net welfare gains of retaliation and the greater
capacity to sanction make the threat of sanctions more credible. The more
credible the sanction, the more likely the respondent state is to modify its
behavior, even if sanctions are never actually applied. Finally, the effects of
retaliation in intellectual property are felt by very influential interest groups in
the respondent state. The real value of trade retaliation is in convincing the
target government to change its policies, and thus, the key element of the
sanction's effectiveness is the political pain it can inflict on the respondent
government, not the net pain that the retaliation causes on the respondent state's
economy. As a result, retaliation in intellectual property is likely to give
developing states a greater bang for their buck than other forms of retaliation.
Section IV argues that the prospect of an increased use of intellectual
property sanctions by developing countries politically binds the agriculture
industry and the intellectual property industry in developed states. The greatest
liability for developed states in terms of international trade law is these countries'
Summer 2011
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policies of subsidies for agriculture. The Brazilian government, for example, has
successfully sued the US government over its support of American cotton
exports.' If developing states retaliate in intellectual property, it will be the
developed states' pharmaceutical or entertainment industries that will bear the
costs of trade sanctions prompted by agricultural policies. These intellectual
property industries then have an incentive to lobby to change their own state's
agriculture policy, providing a political counterweight to the agriculture
industry's lobbying power. In essence, intellectual property industries in
developing states have become the hostages for their government's compliance
with promises of agricultural reform.
The Article concludes by discussing the limits of these benefits to
developing states. International trade rules, like all of international law, take
place against a background of power-based international relations. Although
developing states may formally have the standing to bring legal claims to the
WTO and the ability to retaliate if authorized, many developing states will not
do so out of fear of backlash from developed countries. The same is true with
the enforcement of intellectual property rights domestically. Some developing
countries may be unwilling to take advantage of the full flexibilities of the TRIPS
Agreement in the face of political pressure from developed states. Both of these
limitations are functions of the system of power politics in the international
system and not the direct result of the TRIPS Agreement. Yet some developing
states, most notably Brazil, India, and China, have sufficient economic and
political weight to resist political pressure and will be able to take fuller
advantage of the trade strategies that the TRIPS Agreement makes possible.
II. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. The Negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement
The addition of intellectual property to international trade negotiations is a
relatively recent development.' There have long been international negotiations

s

6

WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Subsides on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc No
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar 3, 2005) (finding a violation); WTO, Decision by the Arbitrator, United
States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Arbitration by the UnitedStates under Article 22.6 of the
DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCMAgreement, WTO Doc No WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug 31, 2009)
(authorizing Brazil to suspend a set level of trade concessions).
See Susan Sell and Christopher May, Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of
Intellectual Property, 8 Rev Intl Pol Econ 467, 482-85 (2001) (tracing the history of multilateral
negotiations regarding intellectual property rights from the nineteenth century forward); Susan K.
Sell, IntellectualProperty as a Trade Issue: Fm the Pars Convention to GATT, 13 Legal Stud 407, 40711 (1989) (discussing the history of patent law negotiations in the Paris Convention through the
twentieth century).
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on intellectual property rights, but these were always independent of trade
negotiations.7 States negotiated the Paris Convention of 1883 dealing with patent
law and the Berne Convention of 1886 addressing copyright law.' The UN
created an international organization, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), in 1967 to coordinate intellectual property rights laws
multilaterally.' However, intellectual property rules were not part of the Havana
Charter negotiations to form the International Trade Organization (ITO) in
1947 or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 0
A number of developments pushed the issue of intellectual property rights
into the GATT's Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986-1995), which created the
TRIPS Agreement" under the WTO's umbrella.12 Many developed countries
were frustrated by the progress of intellectual property rights negotiations under
the auspices of WIPO. They had several complaints. First, developed state
governments were disappointed with the breadth of WIPO's membership; some
developing governments had joined WIPO but many had not.' Without
voluntarily joining the agreement, developing states did not have any obligations
under international law to establish domestic intellectual property regimes.
Second, the governments of developed states were not entirely satisfied with
WIPO's substantive obligations, as the levels of copyright and patent law
protections established through the WIPO process were weaker than what many

7

8

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round.
Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 Va J Intl L 275, 277 (1997) (noting that, before the
Uruguay Round, intellectual property issues were addressed outside of the GATT system).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 38 Stat 1811, Treaty Ser No 595
(1883); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 38 Stat 1785, Treaty
Ser No 593 (1886).

9

Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Art 3, 21 UST 1749, TIAS
6932 (1967). For a discussion of the creation of WIPO out of the joint administration of the Paris
and Berne Conventions, see generally Christopher May, The Pre-Histoy and Estabshment of the

10

United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization, Final Act and Related Documents, UN Doc E/CONF.2/78 (1948); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat A-11, TIAS 1700, 55 UNTS 194 (1947) ("GATT").
Neither agreement addressed intellectual property issues. See also Sykes, 3 Chi J Intl L at 49 (cited
in note 1) (noting that prior to the WTO, the GATT system left intellectual property rights largely
unregulated).

"

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994)
("TRIPS").
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 UNTS 154 (1994)
("WTO Agreement").
See Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 361-62 & n 118 (cited in 1) (noting that many key developing
states did not join the Paris Convention).

WIPO, 2009 WIPO J 16 (2009).

12

13
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developed countries already had established domestically.1 4 The prospects for
progress on these issues seemed dim as multilateral negotiations to increase
WIPO's level of intellectual property rights failed to reach consensus." In
addition, WIPO rules did not cover a range of new intellectual property areas,
such as computer circuits and software, and did not have much of a dispute
settlement system. If a state failed to abide by the intellectual property standards
established in WIPO, complaining states had little recourse other than
diplomatic negotiations.
One means for developed states to address these problems was to shift
intellectual property negotiations from WIPO to trade negotiations." The failure
to provide intellectual property rights could be characterized as a trade barrier
(for example, the inability to retain intellectual property rights on
pharmaceuticals or DVDs abroad inhibits trade), so there was a legitimate link to
trade negotiations." Trade negotiation had several advantages over WIPO for

14

15

16

17

18

See Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, The PolticalEconomyof the World Trading System:
From GATT to WTO 149 (Oxford 1995) (discussing how the international conventions that laid
down standards for the protection of intellectual property were administered by WIPO, but
"[m]ost net exporters of IP or IP-intensive goods were not fully satisfied with the existing
conventions and sought to fill certain gaps through the TRIP[S] Agreement"); Susan K. Sell,
Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, 49 Intl
Org 315, 321 (1995) (noting that the US repeatedly pushed for stronger IP protections at WIPO);
Yu, 82 Ind L J at 858-59 (cited in note 2) (describing the US as resisting developing countries'
demands regarding IP law and eventually advocating a shift from WIPO to GATI); Reichman, 29
Intl Lawyer at 351-354 (cited in note 1) (describing how developed states sought to revise patent
protections higher than the Paris Convention while developing countries sought to weaken patent
protections); Sell, 13 Legal Stud at 407-411 (cited in note 6) (same).
See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shiting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual ProperyLawmaking, 29 Yale J Intl L 1, 20-23 (2004) (discussing the shift from WIPO to
GATT, particularly highlighting the deadlock in 1985 after the WIPO diplomatic conference).
See Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 361-62 (cited in note 1) (noting the norm of "lax enforcement"
among members of the Paris Convention).
See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow ofLaw or Power? Consensus-BasedBargainingand Outcomes in the
GATT/WTO, 56 Intl Org 339, 349 (2002) (observing that "in the early 1980s, when the EC and
the United States were unable to attain the required majority in the World Intellectual Property
Organization for broader intellectual property protection, they moved the issue to the GATT,
where they were able to conclude the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) Agreement in 1994").
See Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 346 (cited in note 1) (discussing the link positively and noting
how intellectual property protection is essential to developed countries' comparative advantage in
intellectual property); Gorlin, Business Community at 171-72 (cited in note 1) (claiming that foreign
reproductions "seriously distort international trade, destroy markets, and cause extensive losses to
industry worldwide"). For a rejection of this linkage, see Alvarez and Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at
127-28 (cited in note 2) (rejecting the argument that there is an intrinsic link between intellectual
property and trade); Sell, 49 Intl Org at 321-32 (cited in note 14) (describing the linkage in terms
of economic coercion).
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developed state governments. The GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations, which
created the WTO, gave developed state governments the opportunity to
negotiate a higher level of protection for intellectual property rights." By
moving the forum to the GATT's Uruguay Round, developed state governments
were able to free themselves of the WIPO procedural rules for intellectual
property rights. In addition, developed states were able to leverage their greater
bargaining power on trade issues into greater control of the TRIPS negotiation
process.20 As a result, the TRIPS Agreement generally reflects the developed
world's intellectual property standards. The TRIPS Agreement requires that
states establish a twenty-year patent monopoly,2' a fifty-year copyright
monopoly, 22 and a ten-year monopoly for industrial designs. 23 The TRIPS
Agreement further requires exclusive rights to use trademarks24 and exclusive
rights for the use of marks of geographic origin.2 5 In addition, the agreement
covered a new area of intellectual property law, computer circuitry, with a ten
year monopoly. 26
The WTO Agreement also offered a more rigorous system of dispute
settlement than WIPO. 27 Under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding

21

See Nitsan Chorev, Remaking U.S. Trade Pohcy: From Protectionism to GlobaliZation 153-55 (Cornell
2007) (describing how the US used the Uruguay Round to bring the protection of intellectual
property into the agenda over the objection of developing countries); Hoekman and Kostecki,
PoliticalEconomy at 152-53 (cited in note 14) (discussing how the TRIPS talks neatly divided the
developed and developing countries and how developing countries "increasingly felt that stricter
IP protection was in their interest, if only because it was a necessary component of a more general
move towards a market economy").
See Helfer, 29 Yale J Intl L at 20-23 (cited in note 15) (discussing the three institutional features
of GATT/WTO that made it a superior venue to negotiate intellectual property standards: greater
leverage for the US and EC to negotiate due to having the largest domestic markets, the ability to
link intellectual property protection to other issue areas within GATT/WTO, and a more
effective dispute settlement system).
TRIPS, Arts 27-34.

22

TRIPS, Arts 9-14.

23

TRIPS, Arts 25-26.

24

TRIPS, Arts 15-21.

25

TRIPS, Arts 22-24.

26

TRIPS, Arts 35-38.

27

See Yu, 82 Ind L J at 862 (cited in note 2) (citing the existence of enforcement through the
dispute settlement system of the WTO as a significant modification to the international
intellectual property regime brought about by TRIPS); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 Va J Intl L 335, 339 (1997) (highlighting that the WTO
dispute settlement provisions "put teeth" to intellectual property enforcement at the international
level); Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 385 (cited in note 1) (discussing the possibility that the failure
of one state to enforce its national intellectual property rights could be challenged by foreign
nations at the WTO); Harris, 27 U Pa J Intl Econ L at 725 (cited in note 3) (noting the superior
enforcement power of the VTO relative to WIPO).

19

20
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(DSU), any member state in the WTO could bring a formal complaint against
other member states that failed to abide by trade rules, including the new
intellectual property requirements.2 8 The DSU system would have compulsory
jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. 29 If the DSU system found a violation,
then the respondent state would have a reasonable period of time to remove the
offending measure (or in the case of intellectual property law, to enact the
required intellectual property measure) or it would face retaliatory trade
measures from the complaining state.
Most importantly, trade negotiations provided developed states with a
means of expanding the geographic reach of intellectual property rules. Far more
states were members of the GATT than were members of WIPO. 3 0 While many
developing states did not find it in their interest to have strong (or even weak)
intellectual property laws (and thus did not have much of a reason to join
WIPO), they did want access to developed states' markets.31 joining the GATT
would provide developing states with that market access at the same tariff rates
enjoyed by other GATT members (or even lower tariff rates, under the
Generalized System on Preferences).32 However, the GATT did not assure
"open" access to all goods markets. Agriculture and textile markets, in particular,
were still subject to high levels of protection, but GATT provided some trade
benefits in other areas." Thus, developed states could potentially expand the
range of states that would be bound to intellectual property rules by shifting
intellectual property negotiations into trade negotiations.
The desire to expand the geographic scope of international intellectual
property rules also went hand in glove with efforts in trade negotiations to
bundle all the existing trade agreements together. The shift from the GATT to
the WTO at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was a "single undertaking"that is, states that wished to become members of the WTO would have to agree
28

29

3
31
32
33

See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 276-84 (cited in note 7) (addressing issues relating
to WTO review of national intellectual property laws); Helfer, 29 Yale J Intl L at 20-23 (cited in
note 15) (addressing same issues).
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Art 1(1), 1869 UNTS 401, 33
ILM 1226 (1994) ("DSU") (stating that the DSU procedures apply to all disputes relating to the
covered agreements).
See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 277 (cited in note 7) (noting that "TRIPS signals
the entry of many new states into the intellectual property community").
See Gerhart, 2007 Mich St L Rev at 167-68 (cited in note 2) (describing how states with large
markets have greater bargaining power in trade negotiations).
For a discussion of the Generalized System of Preferences, see Trebilcock and Howse, Regulaion
ofInternaionalTrade at 524-32 (cited in note 4).
See Steinberg, 56 Intl Org at 359-60 (cited in note 17) (discussing developing countries' need to
maintain the access to large foreign markets that GATT provided).
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to all of the new agreements under the WTO umbrella. These agreements
included the GATT Agreement, a new agreement on services (GATS), the
agreement on intellectual property (TRIPS), and a dispute resolution system (the
DSU) as well as other agreements on subsidies, domestic trade remedies, and
related issues. The decision to make the WTO a single undertaking was
particularly important for the agreement on intellectual property. If states were
able to select which trade agreements they wanted to join (as had been the case
in earlier GATT rounds), then many developing states would have opted out of
the intellectual property agreement. Many developing states had chosen not to
join WIPO because they did not have an interest in establishing intellectual
property rules domestically, and they could similarly have refused to join the
WTO's intellectual property agreement. The bundling of trade and intellectual
property protections within the WTO agreement was thus crucial to expanding
the breadth of international intellectual property law. Under the WTO rules, any
state that wished to obtain the benefits of greater access to foreign goods
markets would also have to agree to establish intellectual property rights at
home.
The question remains, however, why developing states did not reject the
WTO Agreements and simply remain members of the GATT Agreement.35
Under this option, developing states would continue to gain the benefits of the
GATT Agreement without signing onto the new agreements. This more limited
option became untenable for most developing countries when the US and the
European Communities jointly announced that they planned to withdraw from
the GATT 1947 Agreement. 6 By doing so, the US and the European
Communities made continued access to their markets on GATT terms

3

35

See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 277 (cited in note 7) (noting that all members of
the WTO have to accept all of the agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round); Harris, 27 U Pa
J Intl Econ L at 728 (cited in note 3) (making the same observation).
Trade scholars view the TRIPS Agreement as a very pro-intellectual property rights-holder
agreement. Hockman and Kostecki argue:
The final outcome of the negotiations suggests that US pharmaceutical,
entertainment, and informatics industries, which were largely responsible for
getting TRIP[S] on the agenda, obtained much, if not most, of what was
desired when the negotiations were launched. US industries sought
multilaterally agreed minimum standards of IP protection in GATT member
countries, an obligation to enforce such standards, and the creation of an
effective multilateral dispute-settlement process. Much was achieved in terms
of negotiating an agreement with substantive obligations and few loopholes. It
is fair to say that developing countries agreed to substantially more than even
an optimist might have hoped for in 1986 when the round began.

36

See Hoekman and Kostecki, PolificalEconomy at 156 (cited in note 14).
See Steinberg, 56 Intl Org at 359-60 (cited in note 17) (recounting how American negotiators
viewed the threat of exit together with the single undertaking as a negotiation "power play").
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contingent upon joining the WTO Agreement. This effectively put developing
countries in the position of having to sign onto the TRIPS Agreement if they
wanted to keep the benefits of the GATT Agreement they had previously
enjoyed." The status quo before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was off
the table: developing states had to agree to the WTO's single undertaking-and
the heightened intellectual property rights standards that came with it-to
maintain their access to American and European markets. Some commentators
have described the exit of the US and the European Communities from the
GATT 1947 Agreement together with the single undertaking requirement of the
WTO Agreements as economic coercion." Richard Steinberg notes that while
the formal rule of consensus decision-making gives legitimacy to GATT and
WTO outcomes, this fiction of legitimacy is undermined by the "raw use of
power that concluded the Uruguay Round, [which] may have exposed those
fictions, jeopardizing the legitimacy of GATT/WTO outcomes and the
decision-making rules."" All of the states that participated in the Uruguay
Round negotiations, including those who opposed the TRIPS Agreement,
ultimately joined the WTO.4
B. TRIPS as Global Intellectual Property Policy
In addition to the complaints over the process by which the TRIPS
Agreement was adopted, commentators have criticized the TRIPS Agreement as
poor economic policy.4 1 Although intellectual property issues can be
37

38

For other examples of power states attempting to change the "reversion point" to improve their
bargaining power, see generally Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Polircs and the Rise of
SupranationalInstitutionschs 5-7 (Princeton 2000) (discussing how elimination of the status quo as a
bargaining option influenced bargaining in the NAFTA negotiations); Thomas Oatley and Robert
Nabors, Redistribuive Cooperation:Market Failure, Wealth Tranfers, and the Basle Accord, 52 Intl Org 35
(1998) (discussing how threats to alter the reversion point shaped bargaining over the Basil
Accord).
Sell, Private Power, Pubic Law at 172-73 (cited in note 3) (concluding that views of international
agreement as mutually advantageous are insufficient to explain TRIPS, which was negotiated "in a
broader context of economic coercion and asymmetrical power"). See also Benvenisti and
Downs, 36 Case W Res J Intl L at 48-49 (cited in note 3) (arguing that TRIPS has perverse
distributive effects that were achieved through economic coercion); Harris, 27 U Pa J Intl Econ L
at 736-38 (cited in note 3) (describing TRIPS as containing "grossly unjust terms" achieved
through economic coercion).

39

Steinberg, 56 Intl Org at 342 (cited in note 17).

4

See id at 365-69 (noting that developing states ultimatedly signed onto the TRIPS Agreement and
analyzing the various motives for their acceptance of the agreement).
See Alvarez and Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 127 (cited in note 2) (stating that the TRIPS
Agreement "facilitates, even enforces with the aid of trade sanctions, what is in the main a
payment by the poor countries (which consume intellectual property) to the rich countries (which

41

produce it)'.
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characterized as trade issues, the GATT Agreement and TRIPS Agreement are
fundamentally different from an economic standpoint. Most economists agree
that in most circumstances, eliminating barriers to trade between nations is net
welfare increasing for each nation and for the global economy. Indeed,
economists argue that a state should adopt open trade policies even if others do
not. As Paul Krugman puts it, "[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be
no need for a World Trade Organization. The economist's case for free trade is
essentially a unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by pursuing free
trade regardless of what other countries may do." 42 The GATT, then, at least to
the extent it promotes freer trade, is in a state's economic (if not political)
interest. The issue of the optimal level of intellectual property protection,
however, is not so straightforward.
Most economists agree that nations should adopt some intellectual
property laws, although what the content of these laws should be is a matter of
significant disagreement. Intellectual property rules involve distributional issues.
The creator of the intellectual property is rewarded with a monopoly over that
work for a period of time-such as fifty years for copyright-and consumers
pay a higher price for these works during that period. The higher cost is a loss
for consumers-they could have access to the work for less money without the
intellectual property protection-but this transfer to the author is justified as an
incentive for authors to produce intellectual property.4 3 But the benefits of
having some intellectual property rights do not tell us what the optimal
intellectual property rule is." The issue is difficult enough that some economists
argue that states should move away from intellectual property rights altogether
and simply provide government-issued prizes. 45

42

43

44

45

See Paul Krugman, What Should Trade NegotiatorsNegotiate About?, 35 J Econ Lit 113, 113 (1997).
See Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1473, 1477 (Elsevier 2007) (discussing how
intellectual property results in "deadweight loss to consumers" but also has its virtues, because
"every invention funded with intellectual property creates a Pareto improvement").
See id at 1477-78 ("The choice among incentive mechanisms, and even the optimal design of
intellectual property laws, depends importantly on the nature of the creative process or, in
economists' jargon, on the model of knowledge creation.").
See generally Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Pries, and Research
Contracts, 73 Am Econ Rev 691 (1983) (analyzing the choices between patents, prizes, and direct
contracting for research services); Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J L & Econ 525 (2001) (discussing how under a rewards system, there
are incentives to innovate without creating monopoly power of intellectual property rights);
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent PriZes, 56 Vand L Rev 115 (2003) (giving an overview on
how if the government could pay patent owners to place their discoveries in the public domain, it
would encourage research and development to produce inventions while ensuring that everyone
benefits from them).
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Moreover, even if high intellectual property protection is good for
developed countries, which tend to produce more intellectual property in the
first place, it is far from certain that similar levels of protection are good for
developing countries.6 There is little reason to believe that a uniform rule is
optimal for all jurisdictions. 47 Nations may value the trade-off between
rewarding invention and consumer surplus differently and thus may maximize
their national welfare by adopting a different level of intellectual property rights
than other nations. These characteristics of intellectual property rules raise the
possibility that the TRIPS Agreement is net welfare decreasing for many
countries and perhaps the world-a concern that economists generally do not
share about agreements such as the GATT that liberalize the movement of
goods worldwide. This concern is at its highest in the case of public health and
pharmaceuticals.4 8

46

See Alvarez and Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 127-34 (cited in note 2) (arguing that states should
be able to have different national laws on "trade and" issues such as intellectual property, labor
law, and environmental regulation).

47

See generally Trebilcock and Howse, Regulation of International Trade at 437-38 (cited in note
4)(arguing that different intellectual property regimes will be optimal for different states); see also
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Propery Treaties, 20 J L Econ & Org 415
(2004) (arguing that the nations negotiating TRIPS preferred a standard that benefited their own
national interests rather than some globally optimally rule and that there is little reason to believe
the outcome of these negotiations are economically efficient).

48

The literature is vast. For a review of these debates, see generally Sykes, 3 Chi J Intl L at 65-68
(cited in note 1); Sell, Private Power, Pubc Law (cited in note 3); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS,
PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to EssentialMedicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 Chi J Intl L
27 (2002); Benjamin Coriat, ed, The Polical Econon of HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries: TRIPS,
Public Health Systems and Free Access (Edward Elgar 2008); Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and PublicHealth: Lighting a Dark Cornerat the WTO, 5 J Intl Econ
L 469 (2002); William W. Fisher and Talha Syed, GlobalJusticein Healthcare:Developing Drugsfor the
Developing World, 40 U C Davis L Rev 581, 662 (2007) (arguing that international institutions, such
as the WTO and TRIPS "must be reformed so as to eliminate their complicity in unjustifiable
harms to the residents of developing countries" and that northern countries have an "obligation
to help alleviate the health crisis in the South"). For a small sample of statements by advocacy
groups to the popular press, see US Bul ing on Drug Patents: One Year After Doha (Oxfam Brie6ng
at
online
2001),
Paper
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/health/downloads/bp33_bullying.pdf (visited Feb
2, 2011); Priced Out of Reach: How WTO Patent Policies Will Reduce Access to Medicines in the Developing
at
online
2001),
Paper
Briefing
(Oxfam
World
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/health/downloads/bp04_priced.rtf (visited Feb 2,
2011); IVTO & Drugs: Wil the Majority Prevail? (Doctors Without Borders Nov 11, 2001), online at
(visited
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=688&cat=press-release
Feb 2, 2011) (press statement issued jointly by Act-Up Paris, Consumer Project on Technology,
Consumers International, Health GAP Coalition, MSF (Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam,
Tebtebba Foundation, and Third World Network).
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III. ENFORCING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DOMESTIC LAW
REQUIREMENTS
The TRIPS Agreement presents novel enforcement issues at both the
international and domestic level. This Section discusses how the standard model
for trade law enforcement-a non-discrimination model-is poorly suited to a
minimum standards intellectual property agreement. Unlike a nondiscrimination
model, where states are free to select their own substantive rules, the minimum
standards regime results in an externally imposed set of rules that have little
domestic support. Negotiators anticipated that different enforcement procedures
would be necessary and provided for domestic-level enforcement institutions.
Rights-holders heralded these domestic measures as a significant achievement in
ensuring the protection of intellectual property rights worldwide. 49 As one noted
scholar of intellectual property wrote, "[Developed countries] expect developing
countries to implement [their] obligations concerning domestic, judicial and
administrative enforcement of foreigners' intellectual property rights, including
detailed provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights to counsel,
injunctions, damages, and temporary restraining orders. These provisions mean
business." 0 What rights-holders did not sufficiently appreciate was that these
domestic enforcement institutions could suffer from the same lack of domestic
support from which the substantive intellectual property laws suffer. The TRIPS
Agreement failed to provide a metric for evaluating state enforcement efforts
and thus allows governments to select their own preferred level of intellectual
property protection. In effect, governments can modulate the effective level of
intellectual property protections within their state by adopting higher or lower
enforcement levels.
At the international level, the WTO dispute resolution system was
supposed to be a backstop against anemic state enforcement efforts.s" Rightsholders expected that their home governments would bring international claims
against governments that failed to vigorously protect intellectual property

49

See Hoekman and Kostecki, PoliicalEconomy at 156 (cited in note 14) (stating that TRIPS is
"noteworthy in the multilateral trade context in that it obliges governments to take positive action
to protect intellectual property rights").

s

Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 385 (cited in note 1).
The WTO dispute resolution process was designed to be mandatory, fast (completed in less than
sixteen months), and able to authorize trade sanctions if the violation was not remedied within a
reasonable period of time. See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Poky of
InternationalEconomic Relations 124-27 (MIT 2d ed 1997). See also Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va
J Intl L at 276-78 (cited in note 7).

51
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rights. 52 For instance, the intellectual property rights-holders anticipated that
their governments could lodge a complaint against developing states for
insufficiently preventing the unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material
or inadequately protecting patent rights in the respondent state's home market.
Yet this secondary enforcement system is also poorly positioned to review
government measures. The TRIPS Agreement's text fails to provide a baseline
against which to review state enforcement procedures. In the one case where the
WTO dispute resolution system considered state enforcement efforts, the
dispute resolution panel gave the government broad leeway in setting its own
level of intellectual property enforcement.
This Section explores all of these TRIPS enforcement issues in detail. Part
A examines what the TRIPS text requires: the creation of certain domestic
institutions, including a host of criminal and civil remedies, and yet no obligation
for the state to dedicate resources to support these institutions. In essence, the
TRIPS Agreement is institution-oriented, not outcome-oriented-the agreement
addresses the issue of domestic enforcement in terms of available procedures
and remedies but does not tackle the more central question of how to evaluate a
state's enforcement practices. Part B discusses what the WTO dispute resolution
system is prepared to demand from states. Negotiators envisioned that the
WTO dispute settlement process would police weak domestic enforcement by
developing states, yet the supranational system does not establish a baseline for
enforcement absent in the TRIPS Agreement. The result is facial review of the
state's enforcement institutions. So long as the state has the requisite laws on the
books, both substantively and procedurally, the state has fulfilled its
enforcement obligations, even if the actual level of enforcement is weak. Part C
examines the system of civil claims and whether a private enforcement system is
an adequate substitute to public enforcement.

52

See Sell, Private Power, Pubc Law at 118 (cited in note 3) (discussing how private industry groups
advocating for the TRIPS Agreement considered a strong dispute resolution process critical to
achieving greater global compliance with intellectual property rights).

53

See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 282 (cited in note 7) (noting that "some of the
complaints [brought regarding the TRIPS Agreement] will surely concern dear breaches-such as
failure to sufficiently prevent trademark and copyright piracy, or refusals to protect particular
technologies, such as health-related inventions"). See also Reichman, 29 Intl Lawyer at 385 (cited
in note 1) (noting that "[f]or the first time, [developing countries] make it likely that states will
lodge actions against other states before duly constituted international bodies, with a view to
vindicating the privately owned intellectual property rights of their citizens against unauthorized
uses that occur outside the domestic territorial jurisdictions").

18

Vol 12 No. 1

The SurprisingBenefits

Brewster

A. The Requirements of the TRIPS Agreement
1. Differences in enforcing a non-discrimination rule and a minimum
standard rule.
While states have engaged in dispute resolution over numerous issues
regarding the GATT Agreement for a half century, the emergence of the TRIPS
Agreement creates unique legal issues. There is a significant difference in the
nature of the legal obligations created by the TRIPS Agreement and the GATT
Agreement. The GATT Agreement is essentially a non-discrimination regime.
States are under no obligation to adopt any specific measures-they can regulate
goods or adopt whatever health and safety standards they prefer so long as the
rules or regulations they do adopt are non-discriminatory.5 4 Under GATT rules,
non-discrimination has two aspects. First, states cannot discriminate between
members of the GATT. This "most favored nation" rule requires that states
provide any benefit offered to one state to all members of the GATT.5 Second,
states must give GATT member imports, after any required duties are paid at the
border, the same treatment as national goods. Imports may not be taxed higher
than domestic goods or subjected to different conditions of sale. By contrast, the
TRIPS Agreement is a minimum standards regime.-" States are not left to decide
on their own what levels of intellectual property requirements are ideal for their
jurisdiction. Rather, the TRIPS Agreement mandates a baseline level of
intellectual property rights.

54

Other agreements under the WTO umbrella have altered this somewhat. The WTO
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures now requires that states
scientific evidence to support any health and safety regulations with regards to
phytosanitary goods. See World Trade Organization, Agreement on the Application
and Phytosanitary Measures, Art 5 (1995).

55

There are several exceptions to the rule. The most important exception is for preferential trading
arrangements, such as customs unions or free trade areas. This exception allows members of the
EU to impose lower duties on imports from other EU states than they offer to American exports.
Similarly, the exception allows members of NAFTA to offer preferential duty rates to one
another. There are other exceptions as well, including the exception for preferential treatment of
developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences. See Trebilcock and Howse,
Reguladion ofInternationalTrade at 524-32 (cited in note 4).
See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 276-79 (cited in note 7) ("In contrast to the

56

Agreement
have some
sanitary or
of Sanitary

traditional GATT provisions, the minimum standards propounded by the TRIPS Agreement are
based on the Berne and Paris Conventions, treaties that are principally aimed at promoting
innovation by curbing practices deemed to constitute free riding.").
57

One can see why a non-discrimination regime was less than ideal for foreign holders of
intellectual property rights who wished to export their goods. If a state offered no copyright for
works of fiction, then the willingness of the state to offer this level of government regulation on a
non-discriminatory basis was of little use to the foreign rights-holder. Without intellectual
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This distinction is significant because it creates different domestic
enforcement dynamics, as well as new legal issues for international monitoring
of compliance." On the domestic enforcement side, the political economy
rationales behind the enforcement of non-discriminatory rules and minimum
standard rules are different. In the non-discrimination context, there must be
some level of domestic political support for the national law. Without such
domestic support, the government could simply repeal the law or replace the
rule with a more popular alternative. As a consequence, there is reason to believe
that the state will dedicate some resources to enforcing its own laws. For
instance, the state may desire certain health and safety standards because such
standards increase the government's domestic political support. Even if the
government fails to enforce its own laws adequately, this is of little concern for
the international trade system. With an international non-discrimination regime,
whatever level of enforcement the state selects is acceptable because there is not
a positive obligation to adopt certain domestic legislation. The only requirement
imposed by the non-discrimination regime is that the policy is not enforced
selectively in a manner that disadvantages foreign goods. 0
A non-discrimination regime is also relatively simple to apply at the
international level. Courts reviewing national actions have a straightforward

58

5

60

property rights abroad, the ability of goods whose value added is primarily intellectual property to
find foreign markets was effectively limited.
The TRIPS Agreement establishes a floor but not a ceiling for intellectual property rights. States
are free to go above TRIPS minimal standards, although few do. Although the TRIPS Agreement
establishes minimal standards in terms of requiring a minimum, the level of intellectual property
protection required is not substantively minimal. The Agreement's floor is arguably quite high. It
mirrors the levels of the intellectual property protection offered by developed states. As a result,
the TRIPS Agreement, although not formally a harmonization agreement (where all states must
adopt the same standard), has in practice harmonized most intellectual property laws because few
states choose to provide protections above those set out in the TRIPS Agreement. See Annette
Kur, InternationalNorm-Making in the Field of IntellectualPropery:A Shift Towards Maximum Rules?, 1
WIPO J 27, 28 (2009) (describing the TRIPS Agreement as having eliminated most differences
between national intellectual property rules even though it is formally not a harmonization
regime); Amy Kapczynski, HarmoniZationand Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in
India's PharmaceuticalSector, 97 Cal L Rev 1571 (2009) (providing a case study of how India has
used the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement-including subject matter restrictions, high
obviousness thresholds, and patent opposition procedures-to maintain a patent law system that
is TRIPS consistent but significantly different from American and European patent systems).
See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 279-80 (cited in note 7) (noting that this difference
in the nature of the legal regimes makes past GATT decisions unhelpful in resolving TRIPS
disputes).
See, for example, World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Korea-Measures
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and FroZen Beef WTO Doc No WT/DS161/AB/R and
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec 11, 2000); World Trade Organization, Report by the Panel, United
States-Secion 337 of the Tanif Act of 1930, WTO Doc No L/6439-36S/345 (Jan 16, 1989)
("US-TaiffAct Section 337").
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baseline for judging non-discrimination: the treatment of domestic goods." The
state is not obliged to offer any specific treatment to its national goods, but if it
chooses to do so, then that same treatment must be extended to foreign goods.
For instance, in the United States-Section 337 case, the GATT panelists had to
determine whether the US system for addressing alleged infringements of patent
or copyright was discriminatory against imports.6 2 The panelists did not have to
make an independent judgment regarding whether the US enforcement system
was fair or justified by the governmental interest. Rather, the panelists could
simply compare the system that the US provided for imports to the system
established for domestic goods. To the extent that there were differences in the
systems and any difference could be detrimental to imports, the US system failed
the non-discrimination test.63
In the minimum standards context, the political economy rationale behind
domestic enforcement is different. Here, the government must adopt the policy
regardless of its constituents' preferences. The government may not have any
domestic support for the policy but nonetheless enacts the statute because it is
required to do so by international law. In this case, the simple enactment of the
law is not a signal that the state is supportive of the policy: the state may put the
law on the books but have little motivation to dedicate resources towards
enforcing the policy. This political dynamic is predictable under the minimum
standards regime, and, unlike the non-discrimination regime, a lack of
enforcement matters. If the state fails to enforce its own domestic rules, then
this is of concern to the international trade community because the state is
arguably failing to maintain its positive obligation.
2. The requirements in the TRIPS text.
Broadly speaking, the goal of the TRIPS Agreement is to convince
governments to enforce intellectual property laws domestically, but the specific
enforcement obligation is much more narrowly defined. The Agreement states
that:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part
are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act
of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,

61

In the most favored nation context, the baseline would be the treatment offered to other
members of the WTO. If any member state's goods were provided more favorable treatment than
the complaining state, then there would be a finding of discrimination. See US-Taiff Act Section
337, WTO Doc No L/6439-36S/345.

62

See id.

63

Id.
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including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements."6
This provision is a demand for states to make certain enforcement procedures
available. The aim of having enforcement procedures is "to permit effective
action against any act of infringement," but the government's legal obligation
extends only to making the required procedures available. It is not an
affirmative obligation to stop acts of infringement, but a requirement that states
provide their legal systems the authority to protect intellectual property. The
Agreement is extremely specific in terms of how the legal system should be set
up. For instance, states must establish criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment or monetary fines, for intentional violations of copyright or
trademark law on a commercial scale. Member states must also create civil
claims for rights-holders to enforce their intellectual property rights, including
giving judicial authorities the power to order injunctive relief and award
damages. In addition, there must also be an administrative system for customs
authorities to hear claims from rights-holders that imported goods are illegally
copyrighted or have an infringing trademark." States must also create a system
of judicial review of all administrative decisions concerning intellectual property
law. 70
This specificity in the design of the domestic legal institutions is in stark
contrast to the TRIPS Agreement's requirement for government enforcement
actions, namely that the state has no obligation to expend resources on these
procedures. The agreement is explicit that the government retains discretion
with regards to its police and prosecutorial resources, stating, "Nothing in this

6

TRIPS, Art 41(1).

65

TRIPS, Art 41(1).
Sell discusses how many intellectual property holders believed that simply creating a system of
domestic intellectual property laws with enforcement provisions would be sufficient to protect
intellectual property rights abroad. See Sell, Private Power, Public Law at 139 (cited in note 3),
quoting Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPS-A Test ofPoltcal Will, 31 L & Pol Intl Bus 789, 790
(2000) (citing an intellectual property lawyer as predicting that the rule of law would be "so
infectious that it would necessarily spur voluntary compliance by developing countries to
implement effective protection').

66

67

68
69

70

TRIPS, Art 61.
TRIPS, Arts 44 (injunctive relief), 45 (damages).
TRIPS, Arts 51-60. States are permitted to establish similar procedures for the violation of other
intellectual property rights but are not required to do so. TRIPS, Art 51 (noting that the WTO
members "ma)' establish customs required for other intellectual property infringements).
TRIPS, Art 41(4) (requiring that "[p]arties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by
a judicial authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in the
Member's law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial
decisions on the merits of the case').
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Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law
in general."" The obligation to establish procedures is an odd fit with the lack of
any requirement to dedicate government resources to enforcement. As Stephen
Holmes and Cass Sunstein have argued, laws are meaningless without the
allocation of adequate government resources to their enforcement. 72 States can
establish domestic institutions, but without government funding and support,
these institutions will be ineffective.
This is particularly true when discussing enforcement actions taken by the
state. The TRIPS Agreement emphasizes the role of sufficiently high remedies
to establish a system of deterrence. 73 The agreement refers to the remedies
themselves as constituting a deterrent, 74 but remedies are only half of the picture.
As Gary Becker observed, deterrence is a function of the expected penalty for
engaging in the prohibited activity.75 The expected penalty is based on two
factors: the criminal sanction and the probability of the state's applying that
sanction. Consider a system of enforcing parking laws. 7 ' The state has control
over both the fine for illegal parking and the amount of police resources
dedicated to monitoring parking. If the government wishes to establish an
expected penalty of $20 for illegal parking, it can do so through a mix of pricing
fines and setting levels of monitoring. For instance, if the state sets the fine for
illegal parking at $40, then it has to dedicate significant police resources towards
monitoring illegal parking, because citizens' expectations of the probability of
the fine's being applied must be 50 percent to maintain an expected penalty of
$20. If the state wishes to reallocate its police resources to other areas, it can
maintain the same level of deterrence by raising the price of a parking ticket. If
71
72

TRIPS, Art 41(5). The paragraph also clarifies that states are not required to have a separate
judicial system for intellectual property law.
See generally Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost ofRghts: Wfrj Liberty Depends on Taxes
(W W Norton 1999) (discussing how there are no rights without the allocation of government
resources to support those rights).

73

See TRIPS, Art 41(1) (calling on states to have "remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements"); TRIPS, Arts 61 (requiring states to have remedies that are "sufficient to provide
a deterrent"), 46 (requiring states to authorize courts to dispose of infringing goods without
compensation to the infringer "[i]n order to create an effective deterrent to infringement").

74

TRIPS, Art 46.

7s

See Gary S. Becker, Crime andPunisbment:AnEconomicApproach, 76 J Pol Econ 169, 176-80 (1968)
(estimating the cost of a crime to an offender as the probability of conviction and the degree of
punishment). For a review of the law and economics of enforcement, see generally A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Economic Theog of Pubic Enforcement of Law, 38 J Econ Lit 45
(2000).
This example is drawn from A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 77-78
(Aspen 2d ed 1989).
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the state decreases the level of police monitoring to ticket one in five illegally
parked cars, the state can nonetheless maintain the $20 expected penalty for
illegal parking by raising the fine on the ticket to $100. The level of deterrence
remains the same even though the fine for illegal parking has increased 150
percent.
Shifting to the lens of behavioral law and economics does not change this
basic finding that the combination of government monitoring and penalties
influences actors' beliefs about the desirability of undertaking actions. Actors
may be risk-averse or boundedly rational and these decision biases may influence
their calculations of the net benefits of a given activity.77 For instance,
individuals may exhibit an optimism bias that leads them to believe that the
probability that they will be ticketed is lower than their actual probability of
detection.7 ' This decision bias may lead the actor to underestimate the expected
penalty of parking illegally and thus engage in an activity more than a perfectly
rational actor would find optimal. Alternatively, individuals may be risk adverse
and weigh the penalty from a ticket more than their gain from parking illegally.
Risk aversion may lead individuals to park illegally less often than is welfare
maximizing (as determined by strict rationality assumptions).79 Decision biases
can thus lead individuals to calculate the expected benefits of a course of action
as higher or lower than would be strictly rational, but the fundamental variables
in the calculation remain largely the same: government monitoring and penalties.
The relevance of this illustration to the domestic enforcement of the
TRIPS Agreement is fairly direct. The state can establish substantial criminal
sanctions for engaging in a prohibited action, but the level of deterrence is
established by the combination of government monitoring and sanctioning.80 If
the government has no obligation to dedicate police resources to monitoring
violations or using prosecutorial resources to pursue these violations, then the
government can decide to allocate its resources to other law enforcement
priorities. Without government resources, the level of deterrence, even with
n

See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theog: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
Econometrica 263 (1979) (discussing how individuals are often risk adverse around a baseline in
probabilistic decisionmaking). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A
BehaioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1476-81 (1998) (discussing other
decision biases).

78

See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Bounded# Rational Actors, in Francesco Parisi and
Vernon Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of IrrationalBehavior 268-86 (2005) (discussing the
optimism bias in the parking ticket example).

7

Id.

g

People comply with the law for reasons other than state sanctions. These reasons normally rely on
ideas of legitimacy. If the members of a polity do not find the nation's laws to be legitimateperhaps because there is little civil society support for the rule-then sanctions are much more
important.
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substantial remedies, is low, if not non-existent.8' The same applies to
administrative actions. If the government has no obligation to dedicate resources
to pursuing administrative actions against private parties, then the level of
deterrence will be low, even if the administrative remedies include the seizure of
infringing goods.
All of this highlights the question of what the TRIPS Agreement requires
of governments in terms of enforcement outcomes.82 If a state enacts the
required laws and yet the territory continues to have a high level of intellectual
property infringement (perhaps the same level as before the enactment of the
TRIPS required legislation), is the state in compliance with its TRIPS
obligations? The answer seems to be yes. The TRIPS Agreement does not
establish a baseline by which to judge enforcement. Instead, the designers of the
TRIPS Agreement opted to rely solely on the creation of domestic institutions.83
If these institutional requirements are met, then the state appears to be in
compliance with the agreement even if the level of enforcement (or deterrence)
is less than many rights-holders had expected.
If a government puts forward no police, prosecutorial, or administrative
efforts into enforcing intellectual property rights, then there would be an issue of
whether the state is complying with the regime in good faith. Similarly, if the
government selectively enforced its law-for instance, enforcing. only
domestically held intellectual property rights or only criminally prosecuting
foreign violators-then this could violate the WTO national treatment
requirement. 4 This Article does not argue that either of these situations would
legally acceptable under the TRIPS Agreement. Rather this Article examines the
much more common situation where a government puts forward some nondiscriminatory enforcement efforts, but those efforts do not decrease the rate of
intellectual property rights infringement or are not as robust as the efforts put
forward by developed states. In these situations, this Article argues that there is
not a violation of the TRIPS Agreement. Governments can comply with the
81

82

83

84

There is always some probability that the government will prosecute a violation so the deterrence
level will almost never be zero, but it can be quite low.
See Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as Tofu? Bringing the
Question to the ITO Under TRIPS, 39 Georgetown J Intl L 217, 221-24 (2007) (exploring how the
US, the EU, and Japan view China's enforcement in terms of outcomes, while China focuses on
transparency and procedures).
This may prove a good strategy for increasing the level of intellectual property enforcement in
states that already have a history of intellectual property law. The TRIPS Agreement demands
higher levels of intellectual property protection, and the state may simply maintain its current level
of enforcement but demand the higher level of protection. Even here, however, the government
could strategically alter its monitoring and prosecution of certain provisions if it wished to return
to the pre-TRIPS level of enforcement.
TRIPS, Art 3.
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agreement in good faith without achieving the level of enforcement established
in developed states with similar laws or even decreasing the national level of
intellectual property rights infringement.
The institutional design of the TRIPS Agreement leads to novel questions
about the enforcement of a minimum standards regime to which this section
now turns. How should a supranational body review a nation's enforcement
practices? The non-discrimination regime provides an obvious metric-the
treatment of national goods-but a minimum-standards regime has no such
comparison group. A baseline could be established in one of two ways: the
agreement could establish a goal for domestic compliance or require that a
certain level of resources be dedicated to the enforcement of the rules. The
TRIPS Agreement is interesting in that the negotiators did not choose either of
these approaches. Rather, the idea seemed to be that if the institutions are
present, then enforcement would naturally spring from the existence of the
rules." In the only case where a government's enforcement efforts have been
challenged at the WTO-the US complaint against China's enforcement of
intellectual property rights-the WTO dispute resolution system was deferential
to government enforcement choices, emphasizing that governments have
discretion in their use of remedies for intellectual property violations.
B. International Review of TRIPS Enforcement Obligations
One of the major advantages to rights-holders in establishing the
intellectual property rules at the WTO was the access that they (or more
specifically, their national governments) would have to a binding dispute
resolution process that could answer exactly this question. Disputes over a
state's implementation of the TRIPS Agreement are within the jurisdiction of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO has the jurisdiction to
adjudicate whether states are fulfilling their obligations and is capable of
authorizing trade sanctions if a state is in violation of trade rules. As of this
writing, there have been twenty-nine complaints regarding the TRIPS

85

See Sell, PrivatePower, Public Law at 139 (cited in note 3), quoting Levy, 31 L & Pol Intl Bus at 790
(cited in note 66) (citing an intellectual property lawyer as predicting that the rule of law would be
"so infectious that it would necessarily spur voluntary compliance by developing countries to
implement effective protection'). For a discussion of the risks of bringing a WTO case against
China because a claim of non-enforcement of intellectual property rights may be difficult to
construct, see Athanasakou, 39 Georgetown J Intl L at 236-40 (cited in note 82) (describing the
lack of relevant case law and on-going bilateral negotiations as the primary challenges to building
a case).

8

See Section III.B.
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TRIPS, Art 64.
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Agreement, nine of which have resulted in a panel report.8 ' The vast majority of
these cases have involved facial violations, claims that the national legislation
does not meet TRIPS requirements. For instance, the Canada-PatentProtection on
Pharmaceutical Products case addressed the Canadian government's policy of
allowing generic drug makers to break patents before the end of the twenty-year
period so that they could have a supply of the drug ready when the patent term
ended." The WTO panel found that this policy violated the letter of the TRIPS
Agreement even though generic drugs were not sold before end of the patent
term. 90
These are the types of cases that the WTO dispute settlement system is
best designed to address. The members of the WTO have signed onto a treaty
that is textually specific with regard to the minimum national law requirements
for intellectual property rights. Where a challenged domestic law fails to
comport with those requirements, the WTO dispute resolution panels can quite
easily enforce the plain language of the treaty and thereby fulfill its obligation
not to "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements." 9' In these cases, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body recommends
that the state bring its national legislation into compliance by removing the
offending provision-for example, the provision that permits the drug
companies to break a patent before the end of the patent term.92 Facial
challenges are not only relatively easy to adjudicate, but they are also easy to
monitor. The state's subsequent actions are observable and verifiable-either the
state modifies its laws or it does not. Any changes in subsequent years are
similarly transparent. If the state reverts to its earlier law, other states and the
WTO system can easily observe this change.
Adjudication is far more complicated when judging the state's enforcement
of its own intellectual property law, and the WTO dispute resolution institution
88

See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes ly Agreement, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispu-agreements-indexe.htm?id=A26#selecte
d-agreement (visited Apr 11, 2011) (listing the complaints).

89

See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Canada-PatentProtection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS114/R, § 4.2 (Mar 17, 2000) (summarizing the argument of the
European Communities who were challenging the Canadian law).

9o

91

92

Id at § 7.38 (determining that the Canadian law was in violation of Article 28.1, which protects
certain rights of patent holders).
DSU, Art 3(2) ("Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.").
See World Trade Organization, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, Canada-PatentProtection of
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS114/9 (Apr 17, 2000) (adopting the
recommendation of the Report of the Panel found at Canada-PatentProtection, WTO Doc No
WT/DS1 14/R at 8.1, which recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body ask Canada to bring
its law into compliance with TRIPS).
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is not particularly well designed to resolve these cases. Unlike facial challenges,
the text of the TRIPS Agreement does not provide a clear standard for
evaluating the sufficiency of a state's actions in enforcing intellectual property
protections. As discussed in the last section, the TRIPS Agreement is institutionoriented and provides little guidance for determining what (if any) enforcement
outcomes the state must meet.
Because the GATT was based on a non-discrimination approach rather
than a minimum standards approach, previous GATT panel decisions are of
little guidance on the issue of determining how much enforcement of intellectual
property law is enough.93 The approach of GATT panels was to rule against any
government action that violated the GATT's non-discrimination principles
(unless specifically exempted under the GATI Agreement). 94 The same zerotolerance approach does not translate to evaluating the enforcement of a minimum
standards regime. Certainly, the WTO dispute resolution system would not find
every instance of non-enforcement of intellectual property laws to be a violation
of the TRIPS Agreement. On a practical level, this would put every state in
violation of the TRIPS Agreement. Even developed countries that dedicate
significant government resources to enforcing intellectual property laws have
some non-zero level of domestic violations. On a theoretical level, the concept
of domestic enforcement of laws does not require eliminating all violations of a
rule. Well-established ideas and practices, such as setting law enforcement
priorities and prosecutorial discretion, all implicitly accept that domestic law
enforcement will be less than perfect.
Once we depart from the GATT approach of zero tolerance, the critical
issue becomes a qualitative judgment of what level of enforcement is adequate.
This is a standard that the TRIPS Agreement does not establish and one that the
dispute resolution system is in a poor position to provide." The dispute
settlement system would have to create this standard independently.96 Any such

93

See Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, 37 Va J Intl L at 279-80 (cited in note 7) (discussing how the
difference in focus between TRIPS and GATT "means that participants in disputes involving
intellectual property will be moving in largely uncharted waters. They will probably not receive
much guidance from the case law that developed during the resolution of prior GATT disputes").
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See, for example, US-TariffAct Section 337, WTO Doc No L/6439-36S/345 at 5.11 (holding that
Article III's "no less favorable" treatment requirement is generally applicable); GATT, Art XXIV
(creating an exception for preferential trade agreements); GATT, Art XX (creating exceptions for
a host of issues including morals, environmental preservation, and health and safety regulations).
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Any Appellate Body or panel created standard would almost certainly alter the obligations of
member states in contravention of DSU Art 3(2) ("Recommendations and rulings of the DSB
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.").
See Athanasakou, 39 Georgetown J Intl L at 240-41 (cited in note 82) (discussing ambiguity
concerning what level of enforcement is required by the text of the TRIPS Agreement and
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decision, however, would have a significant distributional impact on the costs of
the TRIPS Agreement to states by creating a threshold where the states had not.
These are issues that have traditionally been left to states to negotiate amongst
themselves, and the WTO Appellate Body (as well as the panels) will be
reluctant to invent such a substantive requirement (with such obvious
distributional effects) where the treaty is silent.
The WTO has thus far taken an approach that is deferential to
governments' domestic enforcement choices. In the only case where intellectual
property rights enforcement efforts (rather than the existence of the domestic
institutions) has been at issue, the China-Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (China-IPR) case, the WTO dispute
resolution panel largely affirmed the Chinese government's enforcement of
intellectual property rights as consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.17 The
complaining state, the US, brought a number of claims, two of which dealt
primarily with enforcement issues.98
First, the US government challenged the Chinese policy of not criminally
prosecuting those intellectual property infringements below a certain quantitative
threshold. The TRIPS Agreement requires that criminal courts be granted the
authority to impose criminal penalties "in cases of wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." 9 The Chinese
criminal statute, however, did not provide for the prosecution of any
infringement below a quantitative threshold.'" The US government maintained
that the threshold was a violation of the TRIPS Agreement because
infringement on a "commercial scale" could occur below the threshold.' The
considering the possibility that the WTO dispute settlement system would have to announce a
standard).

97

World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, China-Measures Afecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R (Mar 19, 2009) ("ChinaIPR"). For commentary on this decision, see James Mendenhall, WFO Panel Report on Consistency of
Chinese IntellectualProperty Standards,13 ASIL Insight (American Society of International Law 2009),
online at http://www.asil.org/insights090403.cfm (visited Apr 11, 2011). See also Tomer Broude,
It's Easily Done: The China-IntellectualPropertj Rights Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of Expression,
online
at
Paper
No
22-09
(Oct
2009),
Hebrew
Univ
Intl
Research
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1492222 (visited Apr 11, 2011).
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The US raised one facial enforcement claim, citing the Chinese government's failure to provide
copyright protection to creative works that the government had banned. The panel found that the
failure to provide copyright was itself a violation and necessarily also entailed the denial of
enforcement procedures for the copyright. See China-IPR, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at
7.177-7.181.

99

TRIPS, Art 61.

1oo See China-IPR,WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.193-7.202, 7.396-7.414.
01

This claim can be conceptualized as a good faith argument: the Chinese government was not
acting in good faith by publicly announcing that it would refuse to prosecute a certain class of
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panel found that the Chinese statute was consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
It held that the term "commercial scale" meant more than commercial activity
and would vary in different markets and that the US government had not
demonstrated that the threshold was unreasonable for the Chinese
marketplace.102 In the absence of evidence that the Chinese standard was
inappropriate, the dispute settlement panel deferred to the Chinese
government's decision regarding the functioning of its criminal law system.' 03
Second, the US government alleged that China's customs measures
regarding the seizure of infringing goods were inconsistent with the TRIPS
Agreement.4 The challenged Chinese customs measures provided officials with
several options for disposing of seized goods. The goods could be donated to
social welfare organizations (namely, domestic charities), or sold to the
intellectual property rights-holder. Where neither of these options was available,
the customs measures directed that the good should be sold at auction if the
infringing characteristics could be eradicated. If infringement could not be
eradicated, the goods should be destroyed.'0 o The US government argued that
the TRIPS Agreement requires that customs officials have the authority to order
the destruction or disposal of infringing goods,o' and these customs measures

102

infringers. The WTO panel rejected the US argument that the Chinese policy was a violation of
the TRIPS Agreement.
See id at 7.395-7.682. See also Mendenhall, 13 ASIL Insight (cited in note 97).
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China-IPR,WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.395--7.682.

104

See id at 7.193-7.197.
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See id at 7.194.
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TRIPS, Art 59:

Without prejudice to other rights of action open to the right holder and
subject to the right of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority,
competent authorities shall have the authory to order the destruction or disposal of
infringinggoods in accordance with the principles set out in Article 46. In regard
to counterfeit trademark goods, the authorities shall not allow the reexportation of the infringing goods in an unaltered state or subject them to a
different customs procedure, other than in exceptional circumstances
(emphasis added).
TRIPS, Art 46:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to be
infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this
would be contrary to existing constitutional equirements, destroyed. The judicial
authorities shall also have the authority to order that materials and implements
the predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing goods
be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further infringements.
In considering such requests, the need for proportionality between the
seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the
interests of third parties shall be taken into account. In regard to counterfeit
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were in violation because it created a "compulsory sequence of steps" that
effectively deprived officials of the authority to order destruction or disposal. 0 7
The Chinese government responded that donating the infringing goods to social
welfare organizations was a legitimate means of disposal that moves the goods
out of the channel of commerce, thereby providing officials with the requisite
authority.0
The panel determined that the customs measures were consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement because donations to social welfare groups effectively
"disposed" of the good by removing it from channels of commerce."o
Moreover, the panel found that the TRIPS Agreement's requirement that a
remedy be "available" did not impose an obligation on the government to use
the remedy. So long as officials have the authority to order the disposal of the
good, the officials could choose not to do so.o10 In the panel's words, "the
obligation that Members' competent authorities 'shall have the authority' to
make particular orders attaches to what the authorities are permitted by law to
order, not only to what they must order.""' Thus, even if customs officials
choose to sell the goods to the rights-holder or auction the goods (so long as the
infringing aspects could be removed), the government's actions would still be
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement because the official had the authority to
order the disposal of the goods.
The panel's decision highlights that the TRIPS Agreement's enforcement
provisions are institution-oriented, not outcome-oriented. So long as the state
has the correct set of legal remedies available, the government has fulfilled its
obligation even if it opts not to use its full enforcement power. The panel's
decision further emphasizes the discretion that governments have in
enforcement actions. Governments must provide customs officials and other

107

trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall
not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the
goods into the channels of commerce (emphasis added).
See China-IPR, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.328-7.329 (stating the US's claims that
"because the auction method is mandatory, it deprives customs of the authority to order
destruction of infringing goods at a certain point within the purview of Article 59").
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See id at 7.189, 7.329. The US government argued that there was nothing preventing social
welfare organizations from selling the infringing goods and thus re-entering the goods into the
channels of commerce. The panel found that the US government had failed to show that such
donations were not removing the goods from the channels of commerce. The US government
further argued that this form of disposal would harm the rights-holder, but the panel again found
that the US had not demonstrated that there were any harms to rights-holders from these
donations. Id at 7.288-7.324.
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Id at 7.278-7.279.
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See id at 7.355-56.
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China-IPR,WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.356.
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judicial actors with certain powers, but the government is under no obligation to
ensure that its agents actually use those powers. The failure to use the remedies
demanded by the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily violate the TRIPS
Agreement's obligation to "ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in
this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any
act of infringement of intellectual property rights." 112
This holding is significant for developing states' understanding of what
their enforcement obligations entail. The government does not have an
obligation to dedicate a set level of resources towards monitoring compliance
with intellectual property law and does not have an obligation to use the
remedies established in the TRIPS Agreement. In short, the state can adjust its
effective level of intellectual property protection by providing low levels of
monitoring as well as low penalties, and nonetheless remain in good faith
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement's enforcement provisions. Only where
the TRIPS Agreement is specific that a certain remedy must be used does the
state have an obligation to ensure that its agents impose those remedies.113
C. Private Enforcement Through Civil Remedies
The TRIPS Agreement's requirement that states establish a private law
enforcement system may prove much more valuable to rights-holders than the
public enforcement system. The agreement requires governments to provide
private rights of action for intellectual property infringement, so that rightsholders can investigate and prosecute infringements on their own." 4 States must
provide access to the national judicial system and must give judges the authority
to order compensatory damages, although the judges need not use this power."'
A robust civil law system could raise the effective level of intellectual property
rights within developing states, although there are reasons to believe that the
112

TRIPS, Art 41(1).
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The panel found that Chinese customs measures were in violation of the TRIPS Agreement with
regard to the narrower issue of auctioning goods with an infringing trademark. The TRIPS
Agreement creates special rules for trademarked goods, requiring that "the simple removal of the
trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit
release of the goods into the channels of commerce." TRIPS, Art 46. The Chinese measures had
allowed trademarked goods to be auctioned off if the unlawful trademark was removed. See
China-IPR, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.394.
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TRIPS, Art 42.
TRIPS, Art 45. Interestingly, the TRIPS Agreement does not make governments responsible for
making sure that the national court system actually provides these remedies. Article 45.1 requires
only that "[t]he judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right
holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury that the right holder has suffered." See the
discussion above for the China-IPR panel's interpretation of this requirement. WTO Doc No
WT/DS362/R at 7.356.
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private law system will not fully substitute for a robust public enforcement
system. Rights-holders can bring civil suits against producers or users of
infringing intellectual property but face several hurdles, including indentifying
infringers and securing a remedy.
First, rights-holders must know which actors are infringing on their
intellectual property. Often, rights-holders have only indirect knowledge that an
infringement is occurring. American software companies frequently complain
that their programs are widely copied in the Chinese marketplace, yet these
companies often do not know who is illegally copying or using the software." 6
Statements of losses are made based on estimates of how much software is
being used worldwide.117 For instance, the Business Software Alliance, a
software industry group whose members include Microsoft and Apple,
maintains that software companies lost over $7.5 billion due to infringing
software in the Chinese market in 2009."' The group produces this figure by
estimating how much software is most likely being used worldwide and
subtracting the number of software programs that were legally licensed during
that period.'19 While these estimates are suggestive of infringement, this indirect
knowledge of infringement is insufficient to bring a civil suit. The rights-holder
must demonstrate that specific actors were infringing on its software. This type
of information can be difficult for rights-holders to obtain, particularly in
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David Leonhardt, The Real Problem with China, NY Times B1 Gan 17, 2011) (citing the theft of
American intellectual property in the Chinese market as the greatest economic conflict between
the US and China); Timothy Geithner, The PathAhead for the U.S.-China Economic Relationship (Jan
12, 2011), online at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl019.aspx
(visited Apr 9, 2011) (Secretary of the Treasury's speech to Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies stating the Chinese government's treatment of intellectual property was one
of the top economic concerns for the US government in its relationship with China). The
Business Software Alliance, an industry group, argues that China has the highest market value of
pirated software of any economy other than the United States. Business Software Alliance and
at
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available
8
(2009)
Study,
Piray
09
IDC,
http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/studies/globalpiracystudy2009.pdf (visited Apr 9, 2011).
The economic loss due to intellectual property violations is difficult to calculate. Such calculations
require knowing the level of consumption of the illegally reproduced good (a number that is hard
to quantify given that the activity is illegal and thus consumers are unlikely to report it) and the
rate of substitution to protected goods if access to the illegally reproduced goods ends. The FBI
and the US Customs and Border Protection each estimate that the US economy loses over $200
billion annually to worldwide illegal reproduction of American goods, but the Government
Accountability Office and the FBI were unable to substantiate these figures. See US Government
Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, Intellectual Property: Observations on
Efforts to Quantif the Economic Effect of Counterfeit and PiratedGoods, GAO 10-423, 15-19 (Apr 20,
2010) ("GAO Report").
09 Piray Study at 8 (cited in note 116).
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overseas markets. Without access to police resources, private companies may
lack the information to protect their intellectual property.
Where rights-holders focus on producers of infringing material, the
usefulness of civil enforcement will most likely depend on the types of
infringements that are taking place. If the technology to produce infringing
goods is inexpensive and widely available, such as the technology needed to
reproduce copyrighted music or motion pictures, rights-holders may find that
the costs of bringing private actions exceed the benefits. The costs of bringing a
civil suit can be significant and the benefits of shutting down a single infringer
are low because other black market entrepreneurs can take up any slack in the
production of the infringing good. For instance, a civil suit against any single
company that is illegally reproducing DVDs is unlikely to be cost effective
because, even if the defendant company ceases its production, it remains very
easy for other producers to enter the market and start selling illegally reproduced
DVDs.
The situation may be different, however, where the technology needed to
infringe on the intellectual property right is more expensive and leads to
bottlenecks in production. In areas such as the patents on pharmaceuticals,
private suits may be more cost-effective because the capability to reverseengineer and reproduce pharmaceuticals is not as widely available. There may be
only a few firms in the country with the capacity to produce the good. As a
result, it is easier for rights-holders to determine who is producing the infringing
good (lowering the costs of bring the civil case) and there will almost certainly be
fewer entrepreneurs available to replace them (increasing the benefits of ending
that producer's infringement).
Rights-holders may also be disappointed in the remedies offered by the
civil law system. As the China-IPR case clarifies, governments are under no
obligation to ensure that judges impose the remedies included in the TRIPS
Agreement.12 0 The agreement requires that a government provide courts with
the authority to order remedies, such as injunctive relief and compensatory
damages, but courts have no obligation to make use of this authority. Courts can
systematically provide rights-holders with far lower remedies than those outlined
in the TRIPS Agreement. So long as the government provides the court with
authority to order high remedies, the state is not in violation of trade rules.
D. Conclusions on the Domestic Enforcement of TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement provides governments with significant discretion in
administering their domestic enforcement regimes. So long as all of the
120

China-IPR, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R at 7.356.
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necessary procedural requirements are enacted in domestic law-that is, so long
as a procedure exists for making intellectual property claims and judicial bodies
have the authority to impose certain sanctions-then the state is in compliance
with WTO rules even if it dedicates few police or prosecutorial resources to
protecting those intellectual property rights or if its judicial and administrative
bodies offer only weak remedies. More broadly, this discussion highlights some
of the unexpected consequences of exporting domestic institutions to other
national jurisdictions. Intellectual property rights-holders (and the developed
states that represented them) negotiated this institution-oriented approach to
intellectual property rights because these institutions had functioned well in
developed states.121 The hope was to change the legal culture in developing
states by transplanting specific institutions, including specific intellectual
property laws, enforcement procedures, and legal remedies.122 However, this
strategy failed to anticipate fully the importance of different national policy
preferences on the functioning of these institutions. The export of an institution
may not fundamentally change developing states' economic and policy
preferences. As a consequence, different policy preferences mean that these
institutions can and will function differently in emerging market states than in
developed market states.
IV. TRIPS AS RETALIATION
The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and enforcement of trade
rules has a second aspect-the role of TRIPS in the enforcement of trade law at
the WTO. Developing countries have long argued that the WTO dispute
resolution system is inherently biased against them. This bias can be at either the
merits stage of the adjudication-that the panels or the Appellate Body are
biased against their claims-or at the remedy stage.123 Studies have not found
evidence of systemic bias at the merit stage,'124 although developing countries

121 See Sell, PrivatePower, Public Law at 139 (cited in note 3).
122

Id.
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Andrea Bianchi and Lorenzo Gradoni, Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO Law:
Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of InternationalLaw 1 (International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development Dec 2008).
John Maton and Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal Pressures and Coaltion Building
in IVTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J Intl Econ L 317 (2007) (analyzing ten years of WTO dispute
settlements and finding no statistical correlation between a party state's economic strength and
the likelihood that it would prevail before either the Panel or the Appellate Body). However, there
are theoretically oriented arguments why the Appellate Body might feel a political constraint in
highly sensitive cases. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judidal Lawmaking at the IVTO: Discursive,
Constitutional,and Political Constraints,98 Am J Intl L 247, 249 (2004); Geoffrey Garrett and James
McCall Smith, The Politics of WITO Dispute Settlement (UCLA International Institute Occasional
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may choose not to bring a complaint for a host of reasons. There is evidence,
however, of bias at the remedy stage. This bias is not a result of the decisionmaking process of the DSB or panels, but arises out of the structure of the
system itself. The WTO's remedy for compliance is to authorize the complaining
state to impose retaliatory trade sanctions. While this right is equally available to
all states, the capacity of states to retaliate depends on the size of the sanctioning
state's market.125 Thus, the ability of the US to sanction Thailand by raising
duties on Thai goods is greater than the ability of Thailand to sanction the US by
raising duties on American goods. This system is not unique to the WTOother international law systems, including the GATT, that use sanctions to
enforce international rules similarly suffer from this power-based bias-but it is
a significant handicap for developing states attempting to achieve even-handed
trade law enforcement.1 26
This Section addresses the benefits to developing countries of using
intellectual property as a means of enforcing WTO rules at the international
level. Part A discusses the nature of WTO enforcement as a collective
sanctioning regime and the disadvantages that this regime poses for developing
states. Part B turns to the advantages of intellectual property retaliation to
developing countries. As trade scholars have noted, retaliation through the
TRIPS Agreement is both credible and effective. Part C discusses whether this
form of retaliation qualifies as "piracy" and thus should be discouraged. Part D
examines the political economy effects of TRIPS retaliation and how the threat
of intellectual property sanctions has created new trade linkages in developed
states. Intellectual property producers may find that their rights in foreign
markets depend upon their government's compliance with broad range of trade
rules.
A. Collective Sanctioning Regime
The WTO is effectively a collective sanctioning regime. If one member of
the WTO violates trade rules and fails to remove its violating measure, then
Paper Series July 2002), online at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t4952d7 (visited Feb 5, 2011)
(discussing instances where the Appellate Body's legal analysis may be politically constrained).
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Chad P. Bown, Partiaibationin IVTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants,Interested Paries, and Free Riders,
19 World Bank Econ Rev 287, 292-93 (2005); Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in
InternationalTrade Law, 92 Va L Rev 251, 257-58 (2006).
126 Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Deicefor Developing
Countriesin the WITO?, 3 J Intl Econ L 403, 403-04 (2000). This bias has led several commentators
to advocate the use of monetary damages rather than trade sanctions in WTO dispute resolution.
See generally Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek, FinandalCompensation in the WITO:
Improding the Remedies of lVTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J Intl Econ L 101 (2005); Kym Anderson,
Pecuiaritiesof Retalation in IVTO Dispute Settlement, 1 World Trade Rev 123, 133 (2002).
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complaining states are authorized by the WTO to retaliate through trade
sanctions (referred to as the "suspension of concessions" in WTO parlance).127
In a collective sanctioning regime, the trade sanctions almost always target
domestic groups that have significant political power.12 8 More times than not,
the targets include domestic groups who were not beneficiaries of the
violation.129 For instance, when the US sanctioned the EU for its ban on imports
of hormone-injected beef, the targeted groups were not European beef
producers but other agriculture producers, including producers of truffles and
Roquefort cheese.o Similarly, when the EU threatened sanctions on the US for
its restrictions on steel imports, one of the threats was a 100 percent duty on
American exports of citrus fruit.13 ' The point of the sanction in these cases is
not based on some conception of the blameworthiness of the targeted domestic
party. 3 2 For instance, there was no claim that the targeted French cheese
producers were instrumental in imposing a ban on American beef or that Florida
citrus producers were major supporters of steel tariffs. Rather, these groups are
targeted because they are politically powerful and the sanctions give them a
reason to lobby domestically for change to the offending nation's (or union's)
trade policy."'
These trade sanctions work much like other systems of collective sanctions,
including the sanctions on Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The goal is to influence
domestic politics and achieve a change in national policy.'34 The states imposing
127 DSU, Art 22(2).

128
129
130

See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan L Rev 345, 405 (2003).
Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Polical Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade
OrganiZation'sDispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 Theoretical Inquiries in L 215, 224-26 (2005).
Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Delays Release of 'Carousel'Lists in Beef Banana Trade Disputes with Europe,

WTO Reporter (June 6, 2000).
131 Gary G. Yerkey and Joe Kirwin, EU Will Consider Delay in SanctionsAgainst U.S. in Steel Dispute,
Officials Say, WTO Reporter (June 3, 2002).
132 See generally Levinson, 56 Stanford L Rev 345 (cited in note 128). See also Anderson, I World
Trade Rev at 130 (cited in note 126) (criticizing WTO dispute resolution remedies because
sanctions can target innocent parties).
133 Michael J. Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade
Polg 13-14 (Michigan 1997) (discussing the role of targeted groups of exporters in maintaining
domestic support of trade liberalization). Governments may actually be more responsive to these
sanctions than monetary sanctions. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay:
Markets, Pohtics, and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U Chi L Rev 345 (2000) (arguing that
governments internalize political costs more effectively than financial costs). See also Nzelibe, 6
Theoretical Inquiries in L at 228 (cited in note 129).
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See generally Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 138-41 (Peterson Institute for
International Economics 3d ed 2007) (describing how states use sanctions to attempt to achieve
policy change in the targeted state); Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox:Economic Statecraft
and International Relations (Cambridge 1999); Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining
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the sanctions understand that "innocent" parties will be negatively affected but
justify the sanctions based on the parties' nationalities. Although the individual
Iraqis targeted might even oppose the governing regime, they are legitimate
targets because they are part of the Iraqi state. The same is true with WTO trade
retaliation. The groups are targeted because they are understood to have
influence with the government, not due to any individualized responsibility for
the violation. The responsibility to abide by trade laws belongs to the nation,
and, as citizens of the state, the group is a legitimate target.
While trade sanctions have long been part of international trade law,' the
current multilateral trade regime is notable for its regulation of trade sanctions."'
One of the major developments from the GATT to the WTO was the
systematization of trade sanctions for violations of trade law. The WTO's
dispute settlement system not only has compulsory jurisdiction over all WTO
disputes, it must authorize the use of trade sanctions before a plaintiff state can
employ such sanctions. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body authorizes the
level of sanctions (the total amount of sanctions permitted) as well as the form
of the sanction (retaliation in goods, services, or intellectual property).' This is
a significant change from the GATT regime where states often enforced trade
rules unilaterally: the state would make its own determination of whether
another state violated trade rules and would select the level and form of trade

135

136

137

MulilateralEconomic Sanctions (Princeton 1993); David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds, Smart
Sanctions: TargetingEconomic Statecraft (Rowman & Littlefield 2002); Nzelibe, 6 Theoretical Inquiries
L at 224 (cited in note 129) ("Mfretaliation targets a wide range of industries, mobilization [by the
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discrete group of powerful industries that it believes will put sufficient pressure on politicians in
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See, for example, John Conybeare, Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian,
and Hawley-Smoot Confcis, 38 World Politics 147 (1985) (examining trade wars at various points in
history from 1300 forward); John A. C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of
International Commercial Rivaby 73 (Columbia 1987) (arguing that "modem" trade wars,
characterized by bilateral increases in tariffs, began in the fourteenth century).
Warren F. Schwartz and Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiaion and Dispute Resolution
in the World Trade Organitadon,31 J Legal Stud S179 (2002).
DSU, Art 22.4 ("The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by
the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment."); DSU, Art 22.3
(establishing the hierarchy for the form of retaliation). There is a different remedy for prohibited
and actionable subsidies. With prohibited subsidies, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement (SCM Agreement) provides for "appropriate countermeasures." Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Art 4.10, 33 ILM 1140
(1994). With actionable subsidies, the standard is "commensurate countermeasures." SCM
Agreement, Art 7.9.
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sanctions to impose."' The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding now
explicitly forbids such unilateral enforcement.' 39
The existence of the TRIPS Agreement makes retaliation in intellectual
property possible. 4 0 The WTO allows states to suspend concessions made to a
violating state as a means of retaliation. 141 Under the GATT, states did not make
any concessions to one another regarding intellectual property, only concessions
regarding the trade in goods. 4 2 As a consequence, retaliation was restricted to
goods. The TRIPS Agreement expands the range of targets by including
intellectual property issues in the trade bargain.
In an interesting twist, the demand that WTO retaliation include such
cross-agreement retaliation came from the US government. The US government
was concerned about the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement. If crossagreement retaliation was not permitted, then the US government would be
permitted to retaliate for violations of the TRIPS Agreement only through that
Agreement-specifically, the suspension of the violating state's intellectual
property rights. The US government was concerned that developing countries
would not have sufficient intellectual property (or that the intellectual property
lobby would not have sufficient political power) to make the sanctions effective.
Thus, by linking intellectual property and the trade in goods (the trade in which
developing countries are most politically sensitive), the developed states would
have a more effective weapon against violations of the TRIPS Agreement. The
Indian government resisted this linkage-arguing for retaliation to be limited to
each agreement (that is, GATT to GATT and TRIPS to TRIPS).14 3 The result
138

Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive UnilateralThreats in InternationalCommercial Relations: The Limited Casefor
Section 301, 23 L & Pol in Intl Bus 263 (1992) (discussing the US policy of imposing unilateral
sanctions under the GATT system).

139

See DSU, Art 23(2):
[M]embers shall (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment
of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of
this Understanding,... (c) [members shall] follow the procedures set forth in
Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other
obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures
before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement
the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.
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DSU, Art 22.3(c) (explicitly permitting cross-agreement retaliation under certain conditions).
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Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, What You Should Know About Globaizaion and the World
Trade OrganiZation,10 Rev Intl Econ 404, 414-15 (2002).
Andrew L. Stoler, The WTO dispute settkment process: did the negotiatorsget what they wanted?, 3 World
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was a compromise that allows cross-agreement retaliation when other forms of
retaliation are not "practicable or effective" and the conditions are "serious
enough."'"
It is not obvious that these positions are contrary to each state's interests
or those of rights-holders in developed countries. The benefits to developed
countries of enforcing the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries through
the threat of tariffs on goods may be greater than the losses from having
developing countries threaten intellectual property retaliation for developed
country violations of GATT or other WTO agreements. The same logic applies
in reverse for developing states. It is nonetheless notable that the US (and
presumably the American intellectual property rights-holders involved in the
negotiations) wanted to link compliance on intellectual property to compliance
in other WTO agreements. Developed states insisted that producers of export
goods in developing countries become the hostages for their government's
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The linkage goes both ways, however:
intellectual property rights-holders in developed countries may find that they
may suffer economic losses if their government fails to comply with all of the
other WTO Agreements.
B. The Use of Intellectual Property in Sanctions
As trade scholars-including Arvind Subramanian, Jayashree Watal, and
Henning Gross Ruse-Khan-have discussed, TRIPS retaliation has two distinct
advantages over retaliation in goods for developing countries: it is both more
credible and more effective.' 45 Intellectual property retaliation is more credible
Brazil, argued against the inclusion of cross-agreement retaliation in the DSU because they feared
that their inability to implement TRIPS requirements would lead to retaliation in goods); Gilbert

R. Winham, The World Trade Organisation:Institution-Buildingin the MulilateralTrade System, 21 The
World Economy 349, 354-55 (1998) (discussing the Indian government's resistance to the idea of
cross-agreement retaliation).
144
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DSU, Art. 22(3) (explaining that "if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to
suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement,
and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations under another covered agreement"); DSU, Art 22(3)(d) (expanding on these
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violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;
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Subramanian and Watal, 3 J Intl Econ L at 406-07 (cited in note 126); Henning Grosse Ruse-
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Alternative to Enforce Prevaiing WTO Ruings?, 1 (Centre for International Environmental Law 2008),
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because it is net welfare increasing for the sanctioning state and thus the target
state is more likely to expect the sanctions to be applied. In addition, this form
of retaliation is more effective for developing states because the state has a
greater capacity to sanction and the sanctions often single out more politically
powerful groups in the target state.
1. Credible sanctions.
The clearest advantage to retaliation in the TRIPS Agreement is that it is
net welfare increasing for the developing state.' 46 This is notable because trade
experts maintain that retaliation in goods is net welfare decreasing for the
sanctioning state. 1 47 Sanctioning goods, such as cars or food imports, raises the
cost of that good to the nation's consumers. There may be an increase in the
state's revenue from the higher tariffs rates of the sanctioned goods, but this
gain will not be sufficient to offset the net losses to the nation's consumers.148
As a result, sanctions on goods are economically costly for the sanctioning
nation to impose.149 Indeed, trade lawyers frequently refer to the use of sanctions
as "shooting yourself in the foot."so
The "shooting yourself in the foot" analogy should not be taken too far.
As many political economy studies demonstrate, governments strive to
maximize their domestic support, which is imperfectly tied to the nation's net
economic welfare.'"' Some economic policies such as export subsidies and strict
quotas on textiles may be net welfare decreasing, but they can also be politically
popular. 5 2 In addition, the government, which is sanctioning a foreign state for

146
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Subramanian and Watal, 3 J Intl Econ L at 406-07 (cited in note 126); Ruse-Khan, 11 J Intl Econ
L at 334-35 (cited in note 145).
Bronckers and Van den Broek, 8 J Intl Econ L at 103 (cited in note 126); Anderson, 1 World
Trade Rev at 129 (cited in note 126).
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223 (Cambridge 2005) (noting that "[r]etaliation measure are trade destrutive and the injured party
imposing these measures is also negatively affected by these measures").

1so

Bronckers and Van den Broek, 8 J Intl Econ L at 104 (cited in note 126).
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violating trade law, may benefit from a "rally around the flag" effect.'5 3 The
domestic populace may be willing to bear the cost of sanctions to support the
nation's legal claim and may even provide the government with greater support
for taking a strong position in its dispute with the foreign nation. Yet the
possibility for the government to gain the political benefits of imposing
sanctions without facing economic costs is significant. By eliminating the
economic costs of sanctioning, the government is more likely to find that
sanctioning violations of trade law is in the state's interests.
Sanctioning other states for their violations of trade law through the TRIPS
Agreement offers such a possibility. As discussed in Section II, intellectual
property rights involve distributional transfers from the consumers of the good
to the creators of the good. The intellectual property rights-holder has a
monopoly over the good for a certain period of time and thus can charge higher
prices. The consumer pays a higher price than she would on the competitive
market and experiences a loss in consumer surplus. This loss is justified under
the intellectual property regime as a means of rewarding the creator.' 54
When states apply trade sanctions through the suspension of intellectual
property rights, the sanctioning state refuses to respect the monopoly of the
rights-holder. For instance, if the state decides to retaliate by suspending the
patent rights on pharmaceuticals or the copyright on a theatrical film, it is
producing this good without paying royalties to the intellectual property
owner."' The state can produce the good by either setting up manufacturing
facilities itself or licensing private actors to manufacture a specific quantity of the
good. The sanctioning state can then sell the goods in its internal market."'
Regardless of whether the state sells the good at a monopoly price (adding the
profits to the state treasury), sells the goods at a competitive price (allowing the
state's consumers to benefit from the higher level of consumer surplus), or sells
the good at some price in between, the economy of the state experiences a net
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The sanctioning state may also sell the goods in foreign markets. There is no restriction (at least
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welfare increase. The surplus that would have gone to the foreign intellectual
property rights-holder is retained in the economy of the sanctioning state.
The domestic benefits of imposing intellectual property sanctions have the
added benefit of being more credible to the target state. Much of a sanctioning
state's bargaining power when negotiating compliance in international trade
disputes (or any international dispute) lies in its ability to threaten credibly to
impose sanctions. When sanctions are costly to impose, the threat is
undermined."' The target nation knows that the sanctioning state would prefer
not to impose sanctions. Even if sanctions are actually imposed, the target
nation knows that the sanctioning state would prefer to remove the sanctions as
soon as possible. The costliness of sanctions also influences settlement
negotiations. The target nation will offer a lower settlement (less compliance
with the rule or a lower side-payment) if the target nation believes that the threat
of sanctions is not credible (or that the state will remove sanctions shortly) than
it would if the threat were credible because the expected cost of the sanctions to
the target nation is lower than it would be if the threat were credible.
In sum, retaliation in TRIPS allows developing countries to respond to
violations of international trade law by developed states without bankrupting
themselves in the process. The ability to respond to violations of trade law is not
dependent on the economic surplus that the state is willing to sacrifice. In
addition, the economic benefit from the suspension of intellectual property
rights offers developing countries some compensation for the harm done by the
violation of trade rules-something that retaliation in goods does not. The net
welfare increasing nature of the sanctions also helps convince the target state
that sanctions will actually be applied. By eliminating the self-injury aspect of the
sanctions, the target state has less reason to believe that the sanctioning state will
either not carry out its threat or will remove sanctions as quickly as possible.1 8
2. More effective sanctions.
Another major advantage of the TRIPS Agreement in trade retaliation is
that it permits developing states to impose more effective sanctions: developing
countries have both a greater capacity to sanction larger-market states and are
able to target politically powerful interest groups.
Developing states often do not have the capacity to impose significant
sanctions if retaliation is restricted to trade in goods.' 9 The ability to retaliate in
goods is defined by the size of the sanctioning state's import market. For
157
158
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instance, if a state imports only $50 million a year in imports from another
nation (the nation targeted for sanctions), then the state's capacity to sanction
that nation is based on its ability to interrupt this trade. At the extreme, the
sanctioning state can ban imports from the target nation, resulting in displaced
trade of $50 million a year. This is the maximum extent of the sanctioning state's
capacity to retaliate-and is probably too economically disruptive to consider.
The possibility of intellectual property sanctions expands the capacity of
developing states to retaliate.160 The ability to retaliate is no longer based on the
size of the sanctioning state's import market, but instead on its ability to
reproduce intellectual property. For instance, the same state that has only $50
million of imports from its target nation can impose $100 million in sanctions by
reproducing $100 million worth of software, music, or other intellectual property
from that state. Here, the constraint on capacity to sanction is reproduction
technology. Some developing states, such as India and Brazil, have the capacity
to reproduce pharmaceuticals or software, while other developing states may
not.'6 ' But the technology constraint is relatively low for the reproduction of
other types of intellectual property, such as music or films recorded onto CDs or
DVDs. Almost all nations will have the technology necessary to copy CDs or
DVDs and retaliate by (legally) reproducing these goods.
The size of the sanctioning state's internal market is, in theory, a potential
limit on the state's ability to retaliate. However, this may not be important in
practice. The WTO authorization to retaliate in intellectual property provides
the sanctioning state with the legal justification (under international law) to
modify its domestic laws governing foreign intellectual property rights. This
permits the sanctioning state to sell these goods domestically and internationally.
Yet importing states may have their own intellectual property laws, which would
exclude these "retaliation-reproduction goods" from their own markets. While
the WTO authorized retaliation gives the sanctioning state the ability to suspend
parts of its intellectual property laws, it does not provide non-retaliating WTO
members with the right to suspend their intellectual property laws. While this is
a potential limitation in the abstract, it may not be much of a practical problem
for the retaliating state. Customs agents in WTO member states may not be able
to detect the entry of retaliation-reproduction goods into their markets.. In
addition, the retaliating state can export these good to states who are not
members of WTO. As a consequence, the market for a retaliating state's goods
is most likely larger than its internal market.

160
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Subramanian and Watal, 3J
Several developing states
Kapczynski, 97 Cal L Rev
pharmaceuticals well before

Intl Econ L at 405 (cited in note 126).
have the technology to reverse engineer pharmaceuticals. See
at 1576 (cited in note 58) (discussing India's capacity to reproduce
the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement).
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Not only do developing countries have more capacity to sanction in
intellectual property, they may be able to hit higher value targets. When judging
the effectiveness of the sanctions on the target state, the metric is not just the
overall level of sanctions applied but also the political impact of the sanctions.16 2
The same level of sanctions applied to different domestic groups may have
radically divergent effects on the government. The key to a collective sanctioning
system, like the WTO, is selecting domestic targets that wield significant political
influence. 6 6 By selecting private parties within the target state with high levels of
political influence, the effect of sanctions is greater even if the absolute dollar
value of the sanctions remains constant.
Retaliation in intellectual property allows developing states to focus their
economic sanctions selectively on the private parties who have significant
domestic influence in developed states.164 Within the US and the EU, intellectual
property industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry and the film industry,
are some of the most politically mobilized industries."' Comparatively, these
firms may be in a better position to influence government action than industries
that focus on the export of goods, such as citrus or automobile exporters. 6 6
Thus retaliation in intellectual property may not only be net welfare increasing
for the sanctioning state, it may also provide more influence over the
government of the target state. These two characteristics-a greater likelihood
of sanctions and more politically effective sanctions-raise the target state's
expected injury and thereby increases the probability that the developing country
will convince the offending state to cease its violation or command a more
advantageous settlement. The developing state does not actually need to impose
these sanctions for the threat of intellectual property to be a potent weapon.
Developed states may actually settle the dispute (and make more concessions
than they would have without the threat of intellectual property retaliation)
before any sanctions are imposed. 6 1
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Levinson, 56 Stan L Rev at 400 (cited in note 128) (reasoning that the efficacy of non-trade
sanctions against governments depends upon penalizing a particular constituency sufficiently that
the penalty generates political pressure from the constituency on the government); Nzelibe, 6
Theoretical Inquiries in L at 228 (cited in note 129).
See discussion in Section IV.A; Levinson, 56 Stan L Rev at 400 (cited in note 128) (discussing the
ways that collective sanctions influence government behavior by targeting political
constituencies).
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Subramanian and Watal, 3 J Intl Econ L at 407-08 (cited in note 126).
See Ruse-Khan, 11 J Intl Econ L at 334-35 (cited in note 145).
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See the discussion of the US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton case in Section IV.D.
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C. Intellectual Property Retaliation as "Piracy"
It is worth discussing the idea that such sanctions are illegitimate because
they are "piracy," and so should be discouraged (either by the WTO or
individual states) as a form of trade retaliation. The legitimacy of this form of
trade retaliation goes to our understanding of what the role of trade retaliation is
and what the limits should be. This Article discusses two common conceptions
of why intellectual property retaliation may be illegitimate. The first concerns the
fault of the intellectual property holder in the dispute. The second concerns the
idea that "property" is being taken.
1. Targeting intellectual property rights-holders.
The first critique views intellectual property retaliation as unfair or
illegitimate because it targets intellectual property holders for the trade actions of
their home government. For example, when the Brazilian government
announced that it would retaliate against illegal US cotton subsidies by
suspending the patents on some American-owned drugs, the primary American
pharmaceutical industry group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA) responded by stating: "Upon review of the retaliation list
issued by Brazil in the cotton dispute we find that there are products listed made
by PhRMA member companies. We are disappointed that Brazil has gone down
this path as pharmaceutical companies have no stake in this dispute or the US
cotton program."'
There are two responses to this critique. The first reiterates that collective
sanctions based on nationality is the standard means of retaliation in
international trade law. In this sense, intellectual property retaliation is no
different than other types of trade retaliation under the WTO's collective
sanctioning system. The very idea of a collective sanctioning regime, such as the
WTO, is to inflict harm on those within the nation who can lobby for a change
in policy, not necessarily those within the nation who are directly responsible for
or benefit from the violation.'69 Suspending intellectual property rules imposes
an economic harm on the rights-holder just as raising tariffs hurts the exports of
a targeted good. Producers of goods are denied access to foreign markets

16s
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PhRALA

Statement on Bra#l Cotton Dispute (PhRMA Mar 9, 2010), online at
http://www.phrma.org/media/releases/phrma-statement-brazil-cotton-dispute (visited Apr 11,
2011).
Levinson, 56 Stan L Rev at 426 (cited in note 128) (arguing that collective sanctions are
appropriate when the affected parties have the ability to control the behavior of the wrongdoer;
such analysis can be applied to trade sanctions, to whit: if a politically powerful group allows a
government to violate trade rules, it shares culpability for the violation and may be sanctioned
until such time as it prompts the government to change its policy).
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through higher tariffs, while producers of intellectual property are denied access
through suspension of their intellectual property rights. Both experience a
monetary loss due to the actions of their governments, not because of anything
the individual or company has done. If it is illegitimate or unfair to retaliate in
intellectual property because the intellectual property industry has nothing to do
with the respondent state's policy, then the entire WTO collective sanctioning
system is illegitimate.
The second response to this critique examines how a state's violation of
trade rules is related to foreign suspension of intellectual property rights. This
approach requires an understanding of the link between the TRIPS Agreement
and other trade agreements. Intellectual property was formally made a part of
the international trade system at the behest of developed states that wished to
have greater access to foreign markets for their nation's intellectual property
exports. 70 States who preferred lower domestic levels of intellectual property
rights made a trade concession: they agreed to enact more stringent intellectual
property law in return for trade concessions by other states, such as promises to
liberalize the agriculture sector and the textile industry.' 7 ' The granting of greater
intellectual property rights domestically was a political deal-one that is
contingent upon other states' continued compliance with their own trade
obligations.7 2 Because the respect for intellectual property rights exists in
foreign markets as a result of a political bargain between states, there is a
relationship between intellectual property rights and other trade rules. This is true
even if a particular intellectual property firm was not involved in creating the
offending policy. For instance, pharmaceutical companies rarely involve
themselves in the legislative process creating agriculture subsidies, yet the
intellectual property rights-holder's claim to access foreign markets is itself a
result of the rights-holder's home state's actions. As a consequence, it is not
arbitrary for the injured state to fail to maintain its part of the bargain if the
rights-holder's home state does not uphold its own trade obligations.
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Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudaism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 119
(Earthscan 2002). These states were acting in the interests of many domestic firms specializing in
intellectual property who desired greater global protections for intellectual property. Hoekman
and Kostecki, PoliticalEconomy at 156 (cited in note 14); Sell, Pubc Law, Private Powerat 1-2 (cited
in note 3).
Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South GrandBargain:Implicationsforfuture negoiations,in Daniel
L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds, The PolticalEconomy of International Trade: Essays in
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countries' acceptance of TRIPS and developed countries' promises to liberalize agriculture and
textiles markets).
See DSU, Art 22.3 (explicitly permitting retaliation in intellectual property rights under the DSU).
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2. Piracy as theft.
A second critique of intellectual property retaliation is to characterize it as
theft. This resonates with claims from the intellectual property industry that
reproductions of intellectual property abroad are "piracy."173 This leads to the
question of what "theft" means in this context.174 The common conception of
theft as taking a good and thereby depriving its owner of the use of that
property does not apply. Intellectual property is non-rivalrous, meaning that the
good can be reproduced without reducing the availability of the good to others.
We could define piracy broadly as the reproduction of any material that is not
authorized by the author. This is a broad definition because it divorces the idea
of piracy from national law and vests the rights of intellectual property with the
owner outside of any territory's legal framework. This is almost certainly too
broad for this discussion because such a definition is more expansive than any
nation's current intellectual property regime. For instance, this definition would
make many reproductions that are currently legal in the US, such as reproducing
material in the public domain, piracy as well.
More commonly, piracy connotes a more narrow definition: the
reproduction of material in violation of property law."' This anchors the idea of
piracy (as theft) to the nation's property laws; intellectual property rights are
territorially bounded. What is intellectual property theft in one nation may not
be theft in another."'7 In addition, nations have no inherent obligation to offer
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See, for example, Letter from Dan Glickman to Senate judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy
(Motion Picture Association
of America
Nov
18,
2009),
online
at
Apr
11,
2011)
(visited
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22785108/MPAA-letter-re-ACTA
(describing unauthorized reproductions as "piracy"); Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) Special 301 Submission 2009 18, 43, 62 (PhRMA 2009) online at
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/680/phrma-special 301 submission 20092.pdf
(describing foreign reproduction of American intellectual property as piracy); Thomas J.
Donohue, Opening Remarks at the Counterfeiing and Pirag Brieing (Apr 6, 2006), online at
(visited
http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2006/counterfeiting-and-piracy-briefing
Apr 11, 2011) (describing overseas reproduction of intellectual property goods as "piracy" and
estimating that unauthorized reproductions are "crimes [that] cost the US economy between $200
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Ruse-Khan, 11 J Intl Econ L at 339 (cited in note 145) (discussing some definitions of piracy).
The very idea of piracy is that pirates would become rich by appropriating goods in violation of
property laws.
Drahos and Braithwaite, Information Feudaksm at 5-10 (cited in note 170) (discussing how
intellectual property, such as pharmaceutical patents, receives markedly different protection in
different countries).
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intellectual property rights."' In fact, such rights were explicitly viewed as trade
concessions in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
Under this view, a nation's decision to suspend intellectual property law
clears the way for reproductions that are perfectly legal in that territory.
Retaliation in intellectual property thus is not theft by the complaining
government because the government is within its rights under national and
international law to suspend intellectual property law. In short, there is no
violation of national law (or international law). The use of the term "piracy" or
"theft" in this context is simply a rhetorical flourish rather than a legal
conclusion.
D. Political Economy Issue: Linking TRIPS and Agriculture
The prospect that developing countries will increasingly use intellectual
property rules to enforce trade rules against developed states has interesting
political economy implications. If developing countries begin to increase their
use of the TRIPS Agreement as a lever to promote compliance, the target in
developed countries will obviously be intellectual property-dependent industries,
such as the pharmaceutical, motion picture, music, and software industries.
These are politically mobilized groups with the lobbying power to significantly
influence national trade policies. The more notable issue, though, is the likely
target of developing countries' enforcement efforts. Agriculture policies are a
substantial liability to developed states under international trade rules.17 As a
consequence, the relevant political battles within the US and the EU will most
likely be between the titans of the new intellectual property industries and the
well-organized lobbies supporting the older agriculture industry.
The beginnings of this new political economy battle can be seen in the
wake of the United States-Subsidies to Upland Cotton dispute. In that recent case,
the Brazilian government successfully challenged American subsidies for cotton
farmers. This case was important because it was the first complaint by a
developing country regarding a developed country's agriculture policy. Before
the Uruguay Round, trade in agriculture products was effectively unregulated by
the GATT."' The US demanded and received a waiver under GATT for
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agriculture products. Thereafter, all states in the GATT behaved as if that waiver
applied to all states.8 o The Uruguay Round agreements included an Agreement
on Agriculture, which brought agriculture policy back into the realm of global
trade rules. The agreement had significant limitations but imposed some
important constraints that would require developed states, most notably the US
and the European Communities, to alter their current agriculture policies."' The
Brazilian government's complaint was the first to challenge whether a developed
state had taken the necessary steps.'82 The Brazilian government won the case,
although it took four rulings (the panel decision, the Appellate Body review, a
compliance panel decision, and an Appellate Body review of the compliance
decision) and more than five years to achieve.' 83 The WTO later authorized the
Brazilian government to retaliate against the US under both GATT and the
TRIPS Agreement.
The Brazilian government announced its plans to retaliate in March 2010,
in part by suspending intellectual property rights for a number of US firms,
including suspending the patents for some pharmaceuticals held by American
companies.' 8 This sets the stage to observe how these threats will influence the
political economy of agriculture subsidies within the US. Currently, there are few
political forces working against agriculture support. The taxpayers bearing the
cost of cotton subsidies are generally a poorly organized group. The entry of
pharmaceutical or software manufacturers into the political debate to oppose
such subsidies, however, may alter the politics of domestic agriculture policy.
These industries have the political clout to prompt lawmakers to revise aspects
of the US subsidies, if the industries are sufficiently motivated.
Alternatively, the targeted industries may have sufficient influence to
convince the respondent government to pay off both industries (the domestic
industry receiving the subsidy and the foreign industry harmed by the subsidy).
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This latter course is the one the US government is currently pursuing in the
cotton dispute. As of this writing, the Brazilian government has agreed to
temporarily suspend its retaliation in return for an American promise to revise
cotton policy when it enacts a new farm bill in 2012, in addition to providing an
annual side-payment of $147 million to the Brazilian cotton industry.1 16 The
result is that the US government is now supporting two nations' cotton
producers.
The United States-Upland Cotton Subsidies case also highlights how trade
litigation may be an alternative to trade negotiations. If negotiations for greater
market access in agriculture do not advance, then developing states may turn to
litigation as a secondary strategy for reforming agriculture policies. 1 7 There are
indications that the Brazilian government may have been considering this
strategy. During the cotton litigation, the Brazilian government temporarily
delayed its request to the WTO to authorize its sanctions against the US when
Doha negotiations appeared to be advancing.18 Brazil may have viewed a new
Agreement on Agriculture to be a better resolution of its dispute than pursuing
litigation. When the Doha negotiations collapsed in August 2008, the Brazilian
delegation to the WTO renewed its request to impose trade sanctions on the US.
In sum, the intellectual property rights-holders in developed countries were
the primary advocates for the inclusion of intellectual property rights in
international trade law."' The TRIPS Agreement has provided this group with
significant benefits, but it has also held these private actors hostage for their
governments' compliance. Intellectual property holders may find themselves
dragged into domestic political battles over issues that seem unrelated to
intellectual property rights. Yet by linking the respect for intellectual property
rights to other issues regarding market access, these private actors have,
intentionally or unintentionally, positioned themselves in the front line of
international trade disputes.
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V. CONCLUSION
International trade rules exist in the realm of global power politics. Based
on the text and the WTO's recent dispute resolution decisions, developing states
have significant discretion in deciding what enforcement resources to dedicate to
intellectual property protection and in establishing penalties for rights violations.
Yet developed states and intellectual property rights-holders continue to
maintain that the TRIPS Agreement imposes a much more stringent obligation
on developing states. This claim may be backed by traditional power-politics
threats-namely, that developing states may lose trade preferences or foreign
direct investment if they fail to adhere to a more rigid view of the intellectual
property protections. Similarly, developing countries may formally have the right
to retaliate against a developed country's violations of trade rules in agriculture
or other areas but nonetheless refrain from doing so out of fear of the backlash
from developed countries. What is left is a potential separation between what
the TRIPS Agreement actually requires of governments and what developed
states claim the TRIPS Agreement requires. In this sense, the meaning of the
TRIPS Agreement and WTO enforcement provisions is contested as a matter of
general international politics, with the text of the Agreement and the rulings of
the decisions of WTO dispute resolution bodies as only secondary
considerations in the development of a state's trade policy.
The possibility of the withdrawal of special trade preferences-benefits
that developed states can extend to developing states under the WTO's
Generalized System of Preference (GSP)-due to fights over intellectual
property rules is real. 9 o The US government withdrew GSP benefits from
Argentina in 1997 over a disagreement regarding patent test data exclusivity.'
Similarly, the US government withdrew GSP benefits from South Africa in 1998
after South Africa announced its intention to make use of the TRIPS
compulsory licensing provision to produce generic versions of several

HIV/AIDS drugs.192
The use of such power plays was not made possible, however, by the
creation of the TRIPS Agreement. Before the TRIPS Agreement came into
force, the US and European countries had also made continued access to GSP
19

Kapczynski, 97 Cal L Rev at 1627-30 (cited in note 58) (discussing the US's various forms of
unilateral retaliation for developing countries' violations of intellectual property law
implementation).
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benefits conditional on the protection of American and European intellectual
property. The US gave "great weight" to the developing countries' history of
respect for intellectual property rights when deciding whether to grant GSP
preferences, even before developing states had any international trade
obligations to do so."1 The European Communities also denied GSP benefits to
Korea in 1984 (a decade before the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement)
for its failure to offer protection for European companies' intellectual
property. 19 4 In addition, developed states applied unilateral sanctions against
developing countries regarding intellectual property protections. The US
imposed import restrictions on Brazil in 1988 for its failure to respect American
grants of intellectual property rights and threatened India with similar
sanctions. 1
Yet in spite of such threats (or use) of the denial of trade preferences, some
developing states may have sufficient economic and political power to resist this
political pressure. Most notably, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa appear to
be in a position to make use of the full flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement
provides.'19 For instance, in the 1998 dispute between the US and South Africa,
the South African government resisted the US's demand to end their
HIV/AIDS medicines program. The South African government joined forces
with an American AIDS advocacy group, ACT UP, and waged a public relations
campaign to publicly embarrass the Clinton Administration for its resistance to
national medicines programs.197 The Clinton Administration subsequently
changed its position, reinstated South Africa's GSP benefits, and publicly
announced that it would not resist sub-Saharan countries' efforts to compulsory
license HIV/AIDS drugs.' 98 In a similar move, the Brazilian government
adopted a free HIV/AIDS drug program for all registered AIDS patients.'99 To
decrease the cost of this program, the Brazilian government threatened to
compulsory license certain HIV/AIDS drugs. To avoid compulsory licensing,
193

Peter Drahos, NegotiatingIntellectualPpery Pights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in Peter Drahos and
Ruth Mayne, eds, Global Intellectual Propery Rghts: Knowledge, Access, and Development 161, 169
(Palgrave 2002).

Id at 178.
Chorev, Remaking U.S. Trade Poliy at 155 (cited in note 19); Drahos, Negodating IntellectualPropery
Rights at 171 (cited in note 193). The US imposed these sanctions under its "Special 301"
sanctions regime. See Hoekman and Kostecki, PolicalEconomyat 147 (cited in note 14).
196 Kapczynski, 97 Cal L Rev at 1589 (cited in note 58) (discussing the Indian government's
innovative use of TRIPS flexibilities in its implementation of the agreement).
197 Sell, Pivate Power, Pubic Law at 151-55 (cited in note 3).
194

195

198

Id.

199 Joao Biehl, The Activist State: Global Pharmaceuicals,AIDS, and Cidzenship in Bra l, 22 Social Text

105, 105 (2004).

Summer 2011

53

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Merck and Roche offered the Brazilian government a 40 to 60 percent price
reduction on HIV/AIDS medicines.2 00
India, Brazil, and China have also been willing to defend their intellectual
property practices at the WTO. The Chinese government was largely successful
in defending its intellectual property practices against the US in the China-IPR
case. The Indian and Brazilian governments are also challenging the EU's
practice of seizing generic drugs, which the EU considers infringing, that
originate in India and are destined for third-party markets. 201' Brazil and India
maintain that the shipment of these drugs is legal under the WTO 2003 Decision
on TRIPS and public health and thus the EU's practice of preventing these
drugs from reaching third-party markets is illegal. These claims, if successful,
would benefit developing countries that buy generic drugs, even though most of
these countries are not party to the WTO complaint. Thus, even if not all
developing states will fully take advantage of the flexibilities that the TRIPS
Agreement offers, some large-market developing countries will be able to. The
TRIPS Agreement is not necessarily welfare improving for developing countries,
but it has developed in ways that grant some developing states greater bargaining
leverage.
More generally, the TRIPS Agreement illustrates some of the surprising
consequences of linking domestic politics and international law. The TRIPS
Agreement is unusual in its domestic institution-oriented, rather than outcomesoriented, approach.
By creating a legal obligation to change national
governmental structures, including the state's substantive laws and enforcement
procedures, rights-holders hoped to use international law to change the legal
culture of developing countries, embedding within them a greater respect for
higher levels of intellectual property rights into the fabric of the nation's legal
system. Yet mere existence of these new domestic institutions has not
necessarily changed the fundamental policy preferences of national
governments. Instead, these institutions operate differently in states with
different economic interests, leading to lower level of intellectual property
enforcement than in developed states with similar laws and enforcement
procedures. In the process, however, intellectual property rights-holders have
placed themselves in the midst of new political battles in their home states. The
TRIPS Agreements creates a relationship between intellectual property rights
and other trade obligations. It thereby invests intellectual property rights-holders
in the outcomes of trade disputes regarding a wide range of other issues from
agriculture subsidies to textile market access.
200
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